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Countering 'Islamic' violent extremism? The implementation of programs to prevent radicalization by Muslim-led civil society organizations in Malindi, Kenya

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ABSTRACT

This article explores how Muslim-led civil society organizations (CSOs) implement programs to Counter Violent Extremism (CVE) in Malindi, Kenya, while adapting these programs to both their local context and the CVE-policies of Western donors. So far, little research has been done on how East-African Muslims relate themselves to (global) anxieties about Islam and violent extremism. Taking theories within the anthropology of secularism as an analytical frame, I argue that although Western donors try to maintain a public stance of neutrality towards different religions, they perpetuate stigmatizing associations between Islam and terrorism by tacitly mobilizing a distinction between 'moderate' and 'radical' Muslims. Based on extensive ethnographic research, I subsequently analyze how Muslim-led CSOs strategically navigate and challenge these stigmatizing associations as they implement CVE programs in Malindi. I also show how the desire to present Islam as peaceful limits possibilities to address widespread feelings of marginalization among Kenyan Muslims.

KEYWORDS

Violent extremism; political secularism; Islam; Kenya; civil society organizations; Muslims in East-Africa; religious co-existence

Introduction

In February, 2017, a young NGO-volunteer invited me to attend a USAID-funded training organized by a Muslim civil society organization (CSO) from Kenya, that aimed to 'build resilience against extremism and radicalization' in the coastal Kenyan town of Malindi. The training was held in a NGO office, and started with an interactive session in which an externally hired Christian facilitator, together with about ten Muslim and Christian youth, identified 'push- and pull-factors' that are thought to contribute to extremism and radicalization. The youth and the facilitator mentioned poverty, injustice, illiteracy, and divisive politics as 'push factors', and subsequently identified religion, ethnicity, and politics as common avenues along which extremism manifests itself. Finally, the facilitator mentioned Islamic terror organization Al-Shabaab, the 'neo-traditional' *Mungiki* (Smith 2008, 23), and political violence as examples of violent extremism.


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Next, the facilitator asked participants to raise challenges they encounter in Malindi. Two youths argued that as Muslims, they experience harassment by security agents, as well as difficulties obtaining official national identification documents, which one needs, for example, to vote during elections. The facilitator asserted that it would be wrong to address such challenges within mosques, arguing that mosques are places to pray and recite the Qur'an, and should not be used as political platforms. The facilitator subsequently suggested that mosques that have been closed by the government on allegations of extremism in the past have been rightfully closed, because political issues were probably raised within those mosques, which is dangerous because it can lead to inter-religious conflict.

These observations raise questions on how civil society organizations (CSOs) that implement programs to 'counter violent extremism' (CVE) adapt CVE-policy to the context of Malindi. Scholars have asserted that in the wake of 9/11, concerns about terrorism perpetrated by Muslims have contributed to a trend in which Muslims are conceived through a binary frame of 'radical' versus 'moderate' Muslims, in global CVE-policy, international media, and academia (Kundnani 2014; Mamdani 2004; Cesari 2012; Brown 2010). Although the USAID-funded CVE-training discussed above can be considered part of this global trend, it is noteworthy that during the training no one spoke of 'moderate' or 'radical' Islam. Neither did the training exclusively focus on Islam, as the facilitator also mentioned *Mungiki* and political violence as examples of violent extremism. Yet, the facilitator of the CVE-training did make a clear separation between religion and politics, and discouraged youth to politicize religion. This reasoning could be seen as supportive of a particular form of political secularism, in which the separation of religion from politics is seen as important for establishing peaceful religious co-existence. How can we understand such reasoning? After all, interpretations of Kenyan society often point to the prominence of especially Christianity in public life and politics, causing scholars to describe it as only 'nominally', or 'apparently' secular, being 'not entirely successful' in the separation of religion and politics, or having only the 'semblance' of secularity at best (Mwakimako and Willis 2014, 10–11; Smith 2011, 49, 66; Ndzovu 2014, 52; Mazrui, Njogu, and Goldsmith 2018, 20).

The central concern of this article is to investigate how Muslim-led CSOs implement CVE-programs in Malindi, while adapting these programs to both their local context, as well as the CVE-policy of international donors. To explore this theme, this article builds on extensive anthropological fieldwork I conducted in Malindi between August 2016 and September 2017, which aimed at studying modes of religious co-existence between Christians, Muslims, and followers of indigenous African religious traditions. As part of my fieldwork, I studied various Kenyan civil society organizations who receive funds from Western donors to 'build peace', 'counter violent extremism', and to foster 'interfaith harmony'. In this article, I primarily focus on two CSOs that implement the 'Building Resilience in Civil Society against violent extremism' (BRICS) program, which is funded by the U.K. Conflict, Stability and Security Fund, because I had the opportunity to study these two CSOs intensively for an extended period of time. Given the sensitivity of CVE-programing in Malindi, I have anonymized the two CSOs that implement BRICS in Malindi, by referring to them as partner (1) and partner (2).[1] Both CSOs are led by Muslim leaders. This is relevant because although CVE-policies in Kenya have been

critically analysed, little research has been done on how East-African Muslims relate themselves to (global) anxieties about Islamic violent extremism.[2] This is the key question addressed in this article: How do Kenyan CSOs with a Muslim leadership relate to international concerns about violent extremism and the context of Malindi, as they implement the BRICS program? Answering this question is relevant, because it allows us to investigate how the aim of 'countering violent extremism' is conceptualized in U.K. donor policy, and how such aims are subsequently accomodated to the context of Malindi by implementing Muslim-led CSOs. Through such an analysis, the article provides insights into the strategic ways in which Muslim-led CSOs in Malindi navigate and challenge associations between Islam and violent extremism that are implicitly present within the policies of U.K. donors.

The article is built up as follows. After briefly introducing my fieldwork site, I discuss some recent theories within the anthropology of secularism, and show how they can be useful to think with when analysing CVE policy and practice in Kenya. I subsequently examine British policy-thinking behind the BRICS program (from here shortened to 'BRICS') in relation to broader counterterrorism efforts in Kenya, after which I demonstrate how Kenyan CSOs implement it in Malindi. In the final section, I elaborate on three strategies through which Muslim-led CSOs adapt their approaches to both the context of Malindi, and British donor policy. As can be noticed throughout the text, the use of acronyms is common in CVE programing. To avoid unnecessary repetition, this practice is replicated here, while a list of acronyms is provided at the end of the article.

Malindi

Malindi is a religiously diverse town with significant presence of Christianity, Islam, and the indigenous religious tradition of the Giriama ethnic group. The presence of Islam at the East African coast may date back to the 7th century (Mwakimako 2007, 291). Based on centuries of interaction between people of African, Arab, Persian and Indian origins, the term 'Swahili' has come to denote Muslims who inhabit the East African coast (as a highly flexible ethnic label), their language, and their coastal culture (Gearhart and Giles 2013, xiii; McIntosh 2009, 50). First contact with Christianity was possibly already established before the Portuguese arrival in 1498, although Portuguese-Muslim competition often prevented large scale spread of Christianity (Chidongo 2012, 35). During British imperialism (1895–1963), Christian missionaries were particularly successful among many interior populations. As a result, Kenya currently has a Christian majority population, with a significant Muslim minority (Chidongo 2012, 35–54; Kresse 2009, s91). Many Muslims in Kenya live in coastal towns, which are surrounded by rural hinterlands in which other coastal groups such as the Mijikenda often form the majority. In and around Malindi, the Giriama are the most numerous Mijikenda subgroup. Most Giriama in Malindi self-identify as Christians or 'Traditionalists', although some Giriama struggle to cross increasingly sharp ethno-religious boundaries between the Giriama and Swahili by becoming Muslims (McIntosh 2009).

[1] I also anonymized the names of two other Muslim CSOs that receive funding from Western donors to organize activities to 'counter violent extremism' in Malindi, some of which I attended during my fieldwork.

[2] An exception is Wijsen (2013).

Since Kenya's independence, both (Swahili) Muslims and Mijikenda of various religious backgrounds have complained about their relative marginalization in terms of education, land access, economics, and government representation (McIntosh 2009, 9–10; Cruise O'Brien 1995; Kresse 2009). In Malindi, relations between various ethno-religious groups are characterized by often friendly, but hierarchical class and patronage relations (McIntosh 2009, 27–38). This easily becomes visible when one walks around town. Although all ethnic and religious groups are represented among the urban poor, Muslims control most small businesses. They receive increased competition from Christians from various ethnic backgrounds who find their origins 'upcountry', who work many white-collar and governmental jobs and invest in business and tourism. While a small but increasing number of Giriama enjoy economic and political success, many live at the outskirts of town, and struggle to survive as low-wage laborers, motorcycle taxi drivers, or self-subsistence farmers.

Especially since 2011, Kenya's coast has been shaken by Al-Shabaab activity, in the form of several horrendous violent attacks against Christian civilians and state targets, and recruitment efforts (Ndzovu 2017; Anderson and McKnight 2014, 15–25; Botha 2014). Although Malindi has not witnessed any major attacks, it has been used as a recruiting ground, while frequent rumors state that Al-Shabaab also uses Malindi as a hide-out. The threat of Al-Shabaab largely crippled tourism in Malindi, upon which its economy is highly dependent, and remains visible in the armed soldiers that guard a high-end shopping mall and Sunday services of large churches. Consequently, Western donors currently fund various Kenyan CSOs to implement CVE programs in Malindi, several of which I researched during my fieldwork in Malindi. During fieldwork, I soon discovered that religious co-existence and violent extremism are sensitive topics in Malindi. I noticed that questions about religious co-existence would annoy many interlocutors, who felt uncomfortable to elaborate on this topic. Responding to my questions, a Muslim interlocutor nicknamed me 'FBI', revealing how he felt he was under (Western) surveillance as a potential suspect of violent extremism, but also the playful way in which he communicated that my inquiries were not appreciated. Such fear and suspicion are not unfounded, since a prominent Muslim businessman who allegedly cooperated with Western intelligence services was murdered in Malindi in 2014 (IRIN 2014). This incident forms part of broader patterns of violence and suspicion in coastal Kenya, in which Muslims who cooperate with the Kenyan government in its efforts to counter 'radicalization' are on the one hand exposed to security risks due to being targeted by Al-Shabaab and other Jihadist groups (Ndzovu 2017). On the other hand, Muslims who are suspected of being 'radicalised' run the risk of being subjected to severe human-rights abuses by security agencies, including enforced dissappearances and extra-judicial killings (MUHURI 2013; HRW 2014; KNCHR 2015). Given this sensitivity, I gradually stopped asking sensitive questions and listened to conversations that did take place instead. Using this strategy, I conducted extensive participant observation during CSO-activities, and every-day conversations with staff-members and participants. Furthermore, I interviewed BRICS-staff at the British High Commission, and at consultancy/development organizations DAI and Wasafiri, which were hired to implement BRICS.

Political secularism in Kenya

Although research on secularism in various Western and non-Western contexts is booming, anthropologist Matthew Engelke (2015) contends that Africa often continues to lurk in what he calls the 'secular shadows' of Europe and the West. Engelke argues that Africa is often considered irrelevant for the study of secularism because of its presumed religiosity, which has even been termed 'incurable' (Parrinder 1969, 235). According to Engelke, Africa not only frequently functions as a place of absence (here of secularity or secularism), but also as Europe's double, where Africa's presumed religiosity is contrasted with Europe's equally presumed secularity. Similarly, Kenya remains largely absent in current debates on secularism, except for a limited number of works that reflect on the position of Islam in Kenyan law, public institutions, and politics. These works have focused on the meaning of secularism in Kenya in relation to debates on the constitutional recognition of Islamic Kadhi courts (Mujuzi 2011; Vanderpoel 2012; Ahaya 2015), discussions around Islamic headscarves in public education (Wangai 2017), and Muslim political organization (Mazrui 1994; Mwakimako 1995; Ndzovu 2014). This article aims to supplement these works by relating secularism in Kenya to discussions about violent extremism and religious co-existence.

The image of Africa as 'incurably' religious provides no fruitful starting point to analyse how in Kenya, international donors and CSOs aim to regulate and counter 'radical' religiosity through CVE-programs. Of equal little help are popular understandings of secularism that define it in terms of the complete separation of religion from politics and public affairs. To overcome this impasse, I draw inspiration from the work of Talal Asad and Saba Mahmood on political secularism. Building on Asad (2003), Mahmood (2016, 22) argues that political secularism does not involve the (complete) absence of religion from politics and public life, both in Western and non-Western societies. Instead, political secularism can be described as a project that promises religious freedom and equality, which are to be guaranteed by making religion irrelevant to citizens' access to rights and state services and by state neutrality towards various religions. Yet, despite the stated ideal of neutrality towards different religions, Mahmood contends that the state needs to operationalize ideas of what religion is, in order to determine to whom or what religious freedom extends. Such ideas are contested and negotiated through public debates, policy interventions, and juridical regulations. By defining what religion is (and thus ought to be to claim religious freedom), many states paradoxically become involved in the regulation of religion to a high degree, despite claims of state neutrality. Mahmood argues that political secularism should not be understood as resting on a priori distinctions between religion and politics, and public and private domains, but as a project that continuously recreates such distinctions through legal and political contestations. In this way, the role of religion in society is continuously redefined and regulated.

Although Mahmood primarily developed her ideas on political secularism in relation to her research on Egypt's Coptic Christian minority, I believe that her thinking on political secularism is also useful to think through religion-state relations in Kenya. The 2010 Constitution of Kenya guarantees freedom of religion, and state neutrality towards various religions by stating that 'there shall be no state religion'. Nonetheless, Muslims have frequently complained about political and economic marginalization (Kresse 2009; Mwakimako

2007; Ndzovu 2014). This seemingly paradoxical observation does not mean that state promises of religious equality are merely empty words. Rather, they have significantly shaped interactions between Muslims and the state. Scholars have noted how prominent Kenyan politicians strive to present themselves as inclusive leaders who are sensitive to Muslim needs by incorporating them in political administrations and campaigns, inviting Muslims to national celebrations, and hosting *iftar*-dinners during Ramadan, even while occasionally wearing Islamic attire (Ndzovu 2014, 54; Oded 2000, 33–36). Muslims who benefit from such state patronage have frequently responded by thanking those in power for providing support and religious freedom. In this way, Kenyan politicians continually reinvigorate promises of inclusivity and equality to gain legitimacy and Muslim support. Yet, Muslims often treat such promises with suspicion, as these, in their view, are rarely met. These politicians arguably build on the religious inclusivity advocated by president Jomo Kenyatta (1964–1978), who called upon various religions to assist in Kenya's development, and to act as a unifying force to overcome ethnic and racial divides (Ndzovu 2014, 54; Smith 2008, 6–15).

During my fieldwork in Malindi, I noticed how a similar discursive emphasis on peace, development and national unity is currently reinvigorated in relation to the security threat posed by Al-Shabaab in Kenya, and the availability of Western donor money to 'counter violent extremism' that has accompanied it. State actors, religious leaders, and CSOs frequently initiate development projects, while stressing the importance of peace and an overarching Kenyan identity that bridges ethnic and religious divides. I also observed that people generally tend to avoid the political articulation and stigmatization of ethnic or religious identities, which is often negatively labeled as tribalism (*ukabila*) or hate speech. Similarly, many interlocutors argued that Malindi is 'peaceful', and did not like to talk publicly about strenuous relations between various religious groups. Yet, both (Swahili) Muslims and Giriama sometimes privately complained to me about their political and economic marginalization. This public silence can be explained in relation to Kenya's political history, in which concepts like peace and unity have more often been used. For example, during his autocratic rule, President Moi (1978–2002) frequently emphasized the importance of 'peace, love, and unity' to demand loyalty, by combining such messages with implicit threats of (state) violence, in case citizens or religious groups decide not to follow his lead (Kresse 2009, 83–84). Given this public emphasis on peace, development, and national unity, I argue that political secularism in Kenya is not so much about fostering a neutral stance towards various religious traditions by developing a non-religious position, in which religious prejudice is overcome through the 'progressive replacement of religious error by secular reason' (Hirschkind 2011, 641). Rather, it is about cultivating particular forms of religion that support peace, development, and loyalty to the nation-state, in order to 'accommodate religion as a moral force within politics' (Ahaya 2015, 127, 129; cf. Ndzovu 2014, 51–54). Political secularism in Kenya can thus be understood as a project that attempts to mobilize various religions as equal vehicles to contribute to moral citizenship, development, and national unity, in order to overcome interethnic and interreligious strife.[3]

[3]This Kenyan model of political secularism also has roots in colonial times. In my upcoming PhD thesis, I trace how in the Kenyan context, the concept of 'religion' is historically shaped by missionary negotiations around the Swahili concept

The presence of a discursive emphasis on inclusivity and national integration however does not mean that various religions always contribute equally to peace, development, and national unity, or are treated equally by the state. Given Kenya's colonial history, Christian institutions have played prominent roles in providing medical care and development projects. As most education in Kenya has been provided by (former) missionary schools, Christians are also often overrepresented in education and politics. Despite efforts to catch up in the areas of education and service provision, Muslims often continue to occupy relatively marginal economic and political positions vis-a-vis Christians, contributing to widespread feelings of marginalization among Muslims (Ndzovu 2014, 3; Cruise O'Brien 1995, 205–207). From the 1990s onwards, politicians increasingly relied on Christian forms and practices to build support and legitimacy, for example by televising visits to church services and acting as patrons during church fundraisings (Deacon et al. 2017, 3–6). Some Christian leaders and public officials also became increasingly suspicious or even openly hostile towards Islam, for example in debates about terrorism or the constitutional recognition of Kadhi courts (Mwakimako 2007, 288–291; Ahaya 2015). Despite the increasing Christian prominence in public affairs, Muslim efforts in the 1990s to establish a political party (the Islamic Party of Kenya) to claim economic and political rights via multi-party politics were not only undermined by internal Muslim divisions, state repression, and political machinations, but also judicially thwarted on the ground that Kenya is a secular state that does not allow for the politicization of religion (Mazrui 1994, 194). In this context, Muslims have increasingly interpreted government corruption and inaction as perpetrated by a 'Christian government' that is biased against them (Deacon et al. 2017, 8). Partly out of a desire for social justice, some Kenyan Muslims have since explicitly rejected secularism (Ndzovu 2013, 20). Such rhetoric is also taken up by Al-Shabaab, although it is important to mention that not all Muslims who criticize secularism advocate violence or sympathize with militant movements such as Al-Shabaab (Deacon et al. 2017, 11; Mwakimako and Willis 2014). In Malindi, I never heard such views being publicly articulated, as this could easily invite policy or security interventions, even when expressed in a non-violent manner. Nevertheless, I found such sentiments expressed on alley posters in Malindi, that carried texts such as 'democratic elections are tribal elections' (*chaguzi za demokrasia ni chaguzi za kikabila*), which explicitly challenge democratic elections for failing to deliver interethnic harmony and equality.

In the following, I argue that the approaches of CSOs that implement BRICS in Malindi can be understood as responding to this paradoxical situation, in which various religions are on the one hand encouraged to promote peace and national unity (and refrain from politicizing religion), while on the other hand there is a history of Muslim complaints about marginalization, a strong Christian public presence, and occasional anti-Islamic sentiments. In this context, Muslim-led CSOs strive to uphold the idea that Islam is essentially a peaceful religion that, like Christianity, can contribute to peace, development, and national unity. In relation to this aim, Muslim-led CSOs need to strategically navigate and challenge implicit distinctions between 'moderate' and 'radical' Muslims within CVE-policy, as it may confirm stigmatizing associations

'*dini*' (from Arabic, *dīn*), and a political past in which the demarcation and pacification of 'religion' formed a central aspect of colonial and post-colonial statecraft.

between Islam and terrorism. Before I will go deeper into the approaches of CSOs in Malindi, however, I will first demonstrate how U.K. policy behind BRICS also aims to uphold the ideal of neutrality towards various religions that is commonly associated with political secularism, even though it implicitly focuses on countering *Islamic* violent extremism in particular.

BRICS and the 'War on Terror' in Kenya

Kenya has been a focus of international counterterrorism concerns since the attacks on the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in August 1998 (Ndzovu 2014, 118–127). After 9/11, the U.S. built various regional alliances across Africa to support the 'Global War on Terror' and protect strategic interests (Abrahamsen 2005, 56). In Kenya, the U.S. focused on strengthening the counterterrorism capabilities of Kenyan security agencies and the Kenyan judiciary, as well as its own military presence and intelligence (Mazrui, Njogu, and Goldsmith 2018; Abrahamsen 2005). As a U.S. ally in the 'War on Terror', the U.K. has similarly been involved in intelligence gathering in Kenya, supporting Kenyan security agencies such as the Anti-Terror Police Unit (ATPU), and training the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) in relation to military action against Al-Shabaab, such as the KDF incursion into Somalia in October 2011 (Anderson and McKnight 2014, 4; Mazrui, Njogu, and Goldsmith 2018, 28; HRW 2014).

Rita Abrahamsen (2005) argues that compared to U.S. policies, U.K. foreign policy in Africa after 9/11 was less militarized, but nevertheless significantly contributed to 'the securitization of Africa'. In the early War on Terror, the Blair administration perceived underdevelopment and poverty as possible security threats, arguing that the 'underdeveloped' are prone to 'barbarism, anarchy, and arbitrary violence' (Abrahamsen 2005, 66). As a solution, the Blair administration argued that poverty and inequality should be reduced, while the underdeveloped must also be won over by bringing the 'values of democracy and freedom' (Abrahamsen 2005, 70). In line with such thinking, U.S. and U.K. 'hard power' counterterrorism strategies in East Africa were combined with efforts to win Muslim 'hearts and minds' through development support (Bradbury and Kleinman 2010, 36, 46). Such initiatives were informed by the idea that 'radical' (or 'Salafi') Islam, can be countered by strengthening 'moderate' (or 'Sufi') Islam through development projects (Rabasa 2009, 77; Mogire and Agade 2011, 482; Bradbury and Kleinman 2010, 36, 46).[4]

The described hard power counterterrorism approaches in Kenya have been heavily criticized by CSOs, scholars, and Kenyan Muslims. Criticisms have focused on severe human-rights abuses committed by Kenyan security agencies such as the ATPU against terrorism suspects, including enforced disappearances and extra-judicial killings (MUHURI 2013; HRW 2014; KNCHR 2015). Second, scholars and CSOs cautioned that anti-terrorism legislation and the increased repressive capacity of security agents can, and occasionally have been used to crack down on political opponents, such as CSOs critical of Kenya's counterterrorism policy (MUHURI 2013, 61; Mazrui, Njogu, and Goldsmith

[4]Such categorizations were also endorsed by the RAND cooperation, a U.S. think tank which had considerable impact in spreading such views across the globe (Rabasa 2009, 77; cf. Ter Laan, this special issue). For a critical discussion of such simplifying distinctions, see Mwakimako and Willis (2014, 9–10).

2018, 27). Hard power approaches were also criticized for religiously and ethnically profiling Muslims and Somali (Kenyans) in security operations. Many warned that profiling may work counterproductive as it increases the appeal of Al-Shabaab (Botha 2014, 912–913).

Related to these criticisms, Western policies in Kenya followed global trends and increasingly supplemented 'hard power' approaches with 'soft power' preventive CVE-policy (Kundnani and Hayes 2018, 12; Luengo-Cabrera and Pauwels 2016, 2–3). While earlier efforts to win Muslim 'hearts and minds' often mobilized a binary opposition between 'moderate' and 'radical' Islam, recent CVE-policy often no longer explicitly makes such a differentiation. In several recent CVE reports on Kenya, references to Islam are even (almost) completely absent (see for example: European Union 2016; USAID 2011; 2014; 2016; Khalil and Zeuthen 2016; Global Center 2015). The call for proposals of BRICS (2016) also does not refer to Islam and defines violent extremists as 'radicalised individuals who are prepared to engage in, or actively support, acts of violence in furtherance of radically illiberal, undemocratic political systems or ideologies'. It may be that the U.K. has followed wider trends since religious and ethnic profiling in counter-terrorism efforts has been heavily critiqued. Another reason could be that Kenyan partners are reluctant to participate in programs that specifically target Muslims, or fear being associated to Western agendas that 'meddle' with Islamic affairs, which may invite Al-Shabaab reprisals (cf. Khalil and Zeuthen 2014, 9; European Union 2017, 19).

As a Wasafiri consultant shared during an interview, BRICS also responds to criticisms that CVE programs are often based on unfounded assumptions and insufficient evidence (Kundnani 2014, 139–141; Khalil and Zeuthen 2014, 4–6; European Union 2016, 25). BRICS thus takes a modest approach, and aims at 'helping the U.K. government and host governments understand and respond to the challenges of CVE faced in East Africa'. Consequently, BRICS intends to 'initiate pilot projects to help better understand the changing context', in order to 'develop evidence-driven approaches' (BRICS 2016).

Despite admitting that many CVE programs are based on a limited understanding of violent extremism, BRICS still takes inspiration from other CVE programs in Kenya, which is noticeable because interviewed practitioners and BRICS documents often refer to CVE policies of other Western development agencies and institutions (such as: Van Metre 2016; Khalil and Zeuthen 2016; USAID 2009, 2011, 2014, 2016; European Union 2016, 2017).[5] While BRICS has so far not answered my requests to share some of its own policy documentation, I found that the pilot projects that BRICS supports are largely consistent with policy-thinking found in documents of the organizations that BRICS refers to. Most of these documents define 'violent extremism' as an ideological problem, similar to BRICS that defines it as violence in furtherance of 'radically illiberal and undemocratic ideologies'. In other reports, violent extremism is alternatively associated with or defined as 'at its core an ideological struggle' (Van Metre 2016, 7), 'an overtly ideological message' that encourages violence (European Union 2017, 4), or 'supporting ideologically motivated or justified violence' (USAID 2011, 2; USAID 2014, 3).

Similar ideas can be found in recent thinking of the Foreign Commonwealth Office (FCO), that funds BRICS. In 2016, the FCO hosted an international conference

[5]See: https://www.wasafirihub.com/change-initiatives/horn-of-africa-violent-extremism/ (Accessed June 12, 2019)

around the idea that violent extremism can be countered by building 'open, equitable, inclusive and plural societies in which fundamental rights are respected, including the freedom of religion or belief', through civil society engagement. As a result, 'extremist ideologies' would be 'seen in sharp relief as dangerous, anti-social counter-currents to the public good'.[6] Notably, civil society is not seen as a check and balance against government power, but in opposition to extremist ideologies. This idea resonates with broader trends in CVE policy-thinking, in which civil society ideally forms an ideological block with (moderate) religious leaders, security agencies, and governments to counter violent extremism (Kundnani and Hayes 2018, 14–16). Within the Kenyan context, BRICS has actively supported such cooperation by funding state and civil society actors to develop 'Action Plans' to counter violent extremism at the county government level, which are aimed to supplement Kenya's National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism (BRICS 2019).

Crucially however, and again similar to other CVE programs, BRICS does not (primarily) target violent extremists themselves, but populations 'at-risk' of becoming violent extremists (BRICS 2016, 2017). Echoing the earlier 'securitization of Africa' by the Blair administration, CVE reports commonly conceptualize 'at-risk populations' as groups influenced by 'push-factors' such as poverty, marginalization, injustice, and inequality. BRICS (2017) however argues that structural factors alone are not sufficient to explain violent extremism. Rather, it conceptualizes the underdeveloped as 'at-risk' of being influenced by violent extremism, which is understood as related to an 'inflexible and uncompromising ideology', although it admits that 'the extent to which individual actors or supporters embrace this ideology may vary'. It also reasons that there is 'minimal CSO impact' when it comes to 'macro-factors', which are therefore an unsuitable focus area for CVE programs, and instead proposes to focus on social networks through which violent extremism spreads.

Although many CVE reports no longer explicitly focus on Islam, several indicators suggest that CVE-policy continues to conceive Muslims as particularly 'at-risk' of violent extremism, perpetuating a focus on Islam found in earlier 'hard power' approaches. For example, the European Union (2017, 4) argues that local communities 'lack a nuanced understanding' of CVE and therefore 'interpret it as foreign interference with local culture and religion'. The same report, however, reproduces connotations between Islam and violent extremism by illustrating the report with images of youth, women, and men wearing Muslim dress, and the Pumwani Riyadha mosque in Nairobi, from which Al-Shabaab recruitment allegedly took place (Van Metre 2016, 6). Similarly, a recent evaluation of USAID CVE-policy in Kenya acknowledges the problem of ethnic and religious profiling in counterterrorism, but subsequently defends a focus on the Nairobi neighborhood of Eastleigh and the coast (which have significant Somali and Swahili Muslim populations), and the classification of Somali Muslims as particularly 'at-risk' of violent extremism (Khalil and Zeuthen 2014, 5, 7).

A similar paradox can be observed with BRICS, that does not refer to Islam in its call for proposals. Yet, during an interview, a policy official at the British High Commission mentioned that BRICS does focus on *Islamic* violent extremism in particular, but conceals this focus in public documents and statements. The official did not provide

[6]http://forbforeignpolicy.net/preventing-violent-extremism/ (Accessed June 12, 2019)

reasons for this when I asked for clarification. BRICS' emphasis on Islam is confirmed by its geographical focus, as BRICS exclusively supports CSOs working in areas of Kenya with significant Muslim populations (BRICS 2017). As BRICS combines an ideological focus with an emphasis on Islam, I argue that BRICS continues to carry a tacit distinction between 'moderate' Muslims who hold liberal values and need to be strengthened, and 'radical' Muslims that adhere to extremist ideology and need to be countered. By understanding terrorism as an ideological problem to which especially (poor) Muslims are susceptible (if not exposed to liberal values), BRICS policy-thinking suggests that terrorism somehow flows from an extremist interpretation of Islam. Scholars have criticized such thinking in CVE-policies, as it generally ignores the political context of terrorism, while casting suspicion on Muslims in general, as also 'moderate' Muslims are understood as susceptible to violent extremism (Kundnani 2014; Cesari 2012).

At this point, critical readers may oppose that a more exclusive focus on Muslims or Somali in CVE programs is defendable, as Al-Shabaab has primarily managed to gain influence among these groups. My point is however that BRICS does not publicly claim an exclusive focus on Al-Shabaab, while it potentially overlooks other forms of (support for) violence that also meet their definition of violent extremism (see p. 9), but are not practiced by Muslims. Ironically, specific 'hard-power' counterterrorism measures by the Kenyan state could also be considered to meet the definition of 'violent extremism' that is offered by BRICS, if one is willing to understand state violence such as extra-judicial killings as supportive of a political system which is 'radically illiberal' and 'undemocratic'.

Here, Mahmood's thinking about political secularism becomes helpful in understanding British CVE-policy. On the one hand, British CVE-policy advocates the promotion of liberal values such as the freedom of religion, and conceals a focus on Islam, possibly to uphold the principle of neutrality towards different religions and avoid stigmatizing Muslims. On the other hand, these policies simultaneously build on patterns of thinking in which the underdevelopment and illiberal ideologies of Muslims (and Africans more generally) are seen as making them susceptible to terrorism and violence, and thus a potential security threat (European Union 2016, 2). This subsequently legitimizes policy and security interventions to regulate 'extremist' religion, with a particular emphasis on Islam (Mamdani 2004, 8–11, 17–20; Kundnani 2014).

The ways in which BRICS conceptualizes violent extremism also influence how it envisions to counter it. BRICS argues that it aims to do so by 'strengthening community resilience', which involves:

> […] the importance of leadership (frequently religious leadership), strong social and economic networks which include young people, effective communication loops within the community, - and to some extent, contact with alternative pro-social ideas and narratives (BRICS 2016).

Based on these assumptions, a staff-member of DAI explained to me that BRICS funds three types of projects, namely (1) projects that strengthen relations between communities and security agencies (e.g., dialogues between security agencies, politicians, community-policing initiatives, and youth), (2) projects that support 'community influencers', who can influence 'at-risk populations' (through interfaith dialogues and 'counter-narratives'), and (3) projects that include 'vulnerable groups' in social and

economic structures (e.g., peace education and entrepreneurship trainings for youth). From this it becomes clear that BRICS envisions 'resilient communities' as communities that (1) advocate liberal values, (2) have strong (interreligious) relations and connections to the government and security agencies, and (3) engage in internal surveillance and 'influencing' against violent extremism. These interventions are remarkebly similar to domestic U.K., and other CVE programs world-wide (Kundnani and Hayes 2018, 8–10).

BRICS partners in Malindi

Partner (1) and (2) both implement BRICS in Malindi, after responding to a call for proposals (BRICS 2016). Partner (1) is a Muslim-led civil society organization that provides civic education. It implements BRICS by organizing interfaith dialogues, community dialogues, madrassa teacher trainings, and entrepreneurship trainings for women and youth. Partner (2) is a Muslim organization that brings religious leaders together. They implemented BRICS by providing peace education in schools and madrassa's, while sometimes inviting police officers to facilitate dialogue between youth and security agents. Partner (2) also organized interfaith dialogues and radio-broadcasts. Although the organizations employ and engage Muslims and Christians alike, they are both led by Muslim CEOs with close links to various (aspiring) politicians, Muslim leaders, and other (mostly Muslim-led) organizations. While partner (1) and (2) work across wider geographical areas, I focused on activities organized in Malindi.

During my research, I noticed that both partners rarely publicly share that they work on CVE, and never addressed specific Al-Shabaab or other 'extremist' activity in Malindi (such as recruitment activities, arrests of terrorism suspects, or the threat of attacks). For example, when partner (1) provided entrepreneurship trainings, they did not inform participating women and youth that they aim to reduce the appeal of extremism by tackling unemployment. Within the peace education organized by partner (2) in schools and madrassas, children were taught to promote peace, avoid tribalism, and resort to elders or the police in case of conflict or disagreement. Youth were also encouraged to embrace an overarching national identity through slogans such as 'I am Kenyan'. The topic of violent extremism was almost completely avoided. During one peace education session, a young girl mentioned Aboud Rogo as a source of inspiration, a Muslim preacher who was allegedly killed by security agencies for his radical preaching and connections to Al-Shabaab (Anderson and McKnight 2014, 18). Two workers of partner (2) ignored the girl's remark, and explained to me afterwards that they feared Al-Shabaab interference if they made an issue out of it.

The community dialogues of partner (1) involved various community leaders such as religious leaders, village elders, and community policing representatives. The dialogues usually focused on security issues such as crime, drug-abuse, domestic violence, or jealousy among neighbors (which is commonly associated to witchcraft). In these meetings, a participant argued that 'an idle mind is the devil's workshop', implicitly linking these problems to the many jobless youth in Malindi. Elders also argued that they had an important role in keeping peace by being 'role models' for youth, while acknowledging that religion has an important role in bringing peace. The dialogues did not address violent extremism, except for one occasion, in which a facilitator mentioned that the preaching of peace by elders is important in keeping youth from

entering illegal groups (*makundi haramu*) such as Al-Shabaab and the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC), a coastal secessionist movement that primarily mobilized a coastal regional identity (Mwakimako and Willis 2014, 17–18). Although I attended only two madrassa teacher trainings organized by partner (1), I noticed similar patterns there. Madrassa teachers were encouraged to preach unity and peace (*umoja na amani*), avoid the use of ethnic labels in daily communication, and acknowledge the importance of religion for upholding morality ('*bila dini, mtoto atakuwa mlevi ama mchafu*'). During one of these meetings, a government educational officer mentioned Al-Shabaab in passing, arguing that Al-Shabaab 'will disarrange' (*itapangua*) if more children were educated.

The interfaith dialogues of both partners mainly focused on discussing attitudes that enable peaceful interreligious co-existence. This was done by explaining concepts like 'LOVE' as if they are acronyms, standing for desired characteristics such as Learning, being Optimistic, respecting Values, and positive Engagement with others. In other sessions, participants were encouraged to explain and emphasize commonalities between Islam and Christianity. In some instances, terrorism was discussed after it was raised by Christian participants, who exclusively associated the problem with Islam. A pastor once asked a Muslim facilitator to explain where 'the line is between Islam and terrorism', to which the facilitator replied by showing a powerpoint-presentation that provided countless examples of terrorism not perpetrated by Muslims. He subsequently reasoned that terrorism 'has nothing to do with religion', just as medieval crusades were driven by politics and not Christianity. In another dialogue, a pastor explained that he avoids Muslims like he avoids suspected witches, as Muslims could be 'linked to this Al-Shabaab'. Muslims replied by arguing that Islam is peaceful, although one Muslim admitted that a few youths who misunderstand Islam 'are grabbed' by Al-Shabaab (*wameshikwa*). In one session, the topic was not introduced by Christian participants, but by a Muslim facilitator himself. Here, the facilitator wanted to 'demystify the idea that radicalization of the youth takes place in the mosque', and associated violent extremism with a lack of education and knowledge of Islam. He later mentioned political violence as an example of violent extremism, and again later related violent extremism to selfishness (*ubinafsi*), explaining it as an immoral way of dealing with marginalization and grievances.

Based on these observations, I conclude that BRICS partners in Malindi primarily framed their activities in terms of the promotion of peaceful co-existence, development, and (national) unity. As the organizations employed and involved people from various religious backgrounds, they implicitly based their work on the principle of religious equality through the principle of inclusiveness. By actively involving Muslim leaders and madrassa teachers in activities, they also mobilized Islam to preach peace and national unity. Furthermore, BRICS-partners generally avoided discussing sensitive issues that emphasize religious conflict or difference, including violent extremism. In the rare cases that violent extremism was discussed, Muslim participants or CSO-staff strove to 'demystify' the idea that terrorism or violent extremism is somehow related to Islam.

Strategies to evade stigmatization

The approaches of the partners that implement BRICS in Malindi resonate with my earlier observations on political secularism in Kenya, which is characterized by efforts

to mobilize various religions to build moral citizenship, development, and national unity. In this context, partners respond to concerns about Islam and terrorism by striving to uphold the idea that Islam is essentially a peaceful religion which, like Christianity, can contribute to peace, development, and national unity. In this way, Muslim-led CSOs do not so much associate violent extremism with radical interpretations of Islam, but rather with a lack of religion, since all religions, including Islam, are ideally thought to support peace, morality, and unity. This means, however, that Muslim-led partners need to strategically navigate and challenge the tacitly present distinction between 'moderate' and 'radical' Muslims in BRICS, as it may confirm stigmatizing associations between Islam and terrorism.

In what follows, I elaborate on three strategies used by the two Muslim-led CSOs I studied in Malindi to uphold a public image of Islam as a peaceful religion, namely (1) avoiding open debates about violent extremism as they could potentially stigmatize Islam, (2) broadening debates on peace and security to include wider security issues that are not commonly associated with Islam to elude a focus on Islam, and (3) tapping into widely experienced concerns about youth, that do not exclusively focus on young Muslims, and thus escape the stigmatization of Muslim youth.

Avoiding direct discussions on violent extremism

One strategy used by the Muslim-led CSOs that implement BRICS in Malindi is to not directly discuss violent extremism, as this may perpetuate associations between Islam and terrorism. An employee of partner (1) for example compared directly addressing violent extremism to publicly accusing the Giriama of being witches ('*Wagiriama ni wabaya, wote ni wachawi'*), which would confirm common stereotypes about the Mijikenda (Ciekawy 2009). When Christians raised the topic of terrorism or violent extremism during interfaith dialogues, Muslims also explicitly contested associations between violent extremism and Islam.

Besides aiming to circumvent the stigmatization of Muslims, CSOs in Malindi also have security reasons to avoid and challenge associations between Islam and terrorism, and underlying distinctions between 'moderate' and 'radical' Muslims. Even though these binary distinctions are no longer explicitly present in much recent CVE-policy, 'hard power' security and counterterrorist policies have already significantly securitized and politicized such differentiations. In rare instances at NGO-meetings, for example, Muslim youth complained that they are submitted to security checks especially when wearing clothes or beards associated with Salafi-inspired reformist movements (cf. Ndzovu 2014, 116). Many Muslims are understandably reluctant to attract security attention, especially since security agents have often violated the rights of terrorism suspects. Ironically, however, BRICS (2017) interprets 'anger/fear of security forces' as an indicator of being 'at-risk' of violent extremism, extending suspicions about violent extremism to everyone critical of excessive state violence. On the other hand, implementing partners also fear Al-Shabaab interference, as a Muslim CSO worker explained that it is dangerous to publicly identify Western donors, and was careful not to come across as a spy himself while implementing programs.

In relation to this securitization of Islam, in which Islam is increasingly treated as a potential threat to peace and (inter)national security, I found most Muslims in

Malindi to be very reluctant to publicly distinguish between for example reformist and Sufi-oriented Muslims, even though Kenya's coast has a history of passionate debates between them (Kresse 2003; 2009; Mwakimako and Willis 2014, 10–11). The described politicization and securitization of Islam has thus led to a simultaneous silencing of public debates between different Muslim groups, because such debates run the risk of being associated with binary distinctions between 'moderate' (or 'Sufi') and 'radical' (or 'Salafi') Muslims that have informed counterterrorism activities in the past. The development of such 'techniques of inattention' with regard to religious difference, understood by Brian Larkin (2014) as the cultivation of practices of inattention to ameliorate the possibility of conflict, can also be understood in relation to a desire to keep peace by directing attention to what unites rather than divides, because divisive talk could stir up tensions that linger beneath the surface (Spyer 2002). Yet, many Muslims in Malindi nonetheless challenge the on-going securitization and politicization of a binary opposition between 'moderate' and 'radical' Muslims, by avoiding direct conversations about violent extremism, contesting the idea that terrorism is somehow related to Islam, and mobilizing Islam to promote peace and national unity.

These approaches however limit possibilities to directly engage in the 'influencing' against violent extremism that British donors envision. They also restrict opportunities to address widespread feelings of marginalization among Muslims, which I also noticed when I held a lecture for the Malindi Museum Society in August 2017. During this lecture, I shared the story of the opening vignette of this article, in which Muslim youth complain about security harassment and difficulties obtaining IDs. Although I did not tell the story to simply posit their complaints as universally true, a present government official loudly disagreed, claiming that the government does not discriminate on religious grounds. This response exemplifies how public adherence to ideals of religious equality and non-discrimination can in practice limit possibilities to constructively address experiences of marginalization among Muslims.

Broadening debates on peace and security

Both partner (1) and (2) only rarely referred to violent extremism in an open manner in their peacebuilding activities. Yet, they did identify a wide range of more general security issues, such as political violence, crime, drug-abuse, domestic violence, and the MRC. In this way, Muslim-led partners in Malindi arguably aim to broaden discussions on peace and security beyond Al-Shabaab, by focusing on security issues that are not commonly associated with Islam, which eludes an exclusive focus on Islam. I made similar observations while attending activities organized by two other Muslim CSOs in Malindi, that directly addressed violent extremism during their meetings. During activities organized by these two Muslim CSOs, not only Al-Shabaab, but also the 'neo-traditional' Mungiki, criminal gangs from Mombasa, political violence, and the MRC were mentioned as examples of violent extremism. For example, during a CVE-training organized by one of these two Muslim CSOs, a Muslim participant claimed that Giriama youth who accuse elders of being witches (*wachawi*) is 'also part of extremism'.

I aim to investigate elsewhere how concerns about witchcraft, youth gangs, and political violence resonate with local understandings of violent extremism in Malindi, and

how such concerns partly find their roots in colonialism.[7] For my argument here, it is important that broadening discussions about peace and security by including not only Islamic terrorist groups like Al-Shabaab, but also *Mungiki*, criminal gangs, political violence, and witchcraft (accusations) evades an exclusive focus on Islam in CVE-programs. In this way, Muslim-led CSOs are able to circumvent and implicitly challenge Western understandings of violent extremism that primarily associate it with Islam.

Moral concerns about youth

During my fieldwork, I noticed that many religious leaders, politicians, and CSOs in Malindi not only preached about peace and unity, but also frequently expressed moral concerns about youth. Especially jobless young men are often associated with various problems, including drug-abuse, crime, idleness and laziness, dropping out of school, immoral sexual relations, and political violence. Although less often openly discussed, Al-Shabaab recruitment is also commonly understood to be a youth problem, since a Muslim leader argued that youth who misunderstand Islam are 'grabbed by Al-Shabaab'. In several instances, leaders associated the presence of a correct understanding of religion with the absence of youth problems. For example, I once heard a Muslim leader refer to young drug-users by saying that 'they lack religion' (*wanakosa dini*). Similarly, a Giriama elder suggested that youth who accuse elders of witchcraft do so because they are 'no Muslim, no Christian, but also no Traditionalist'. As leaders also commonly emphasize the importance of peace and national unity, they suggest that youth problems not only threaten to corrupt religious morality, but also the roles of youth as upright community members and/or Kenyan citizens.

I argue that the focus of Muslim-led CSOs on youth through peace education and entrepreneurship trainings can be explained in relation to these dynamics. First of all, a focus on youth is consistent with donor policies, that often consider youth to be 'at-risk' of violent extremism (BRICS 2017; Khalil and Zeuthen 2014, 3, 7). The widely experienced moral concerns about youth in Malindi however do not exclusively focus on Muslim youth, but on jobless youth in general. Tapping into wider concerns about youth thus provides Muslim-led CSOs with entry points for community engagement while evading the exclusive stigmatization of Muslims.

In my extensive interactions with various youngsters, some of whom were involved in the programs of partner (1) and (2), I discovered that many youth strongly depend on personal links to religious leaders, politicians, and CSOs to access food, money, or other opportunities distributed during NGO-meetings and political campaigns. Youths often suspect elderly leaders to use funds for peace and development projects for their own benefit, for example by using projects to create a political following by building patron-client relations. Direct criticism of leaders is however rare, as it would be like biting a hand that feeds, and because political criticism can easily be interpreted as an indicator of 'violent extremism'. Although BRICS partners meet their donor's desires

[7]Anthropologist James Howard Smith (2008, 2011) argues that British colonizers associated the *Mau Mau* independence movement with witchcraft, and in this way envisioned witchcraft as a counterpoint to its civilizing mission, state-building, and proper (Christian) religiosity. Smith demonstrates how the Moi and Kibaki administrations have reinvigorated such images in post-colonial Kenya by portraying *Mungiki* (and others) as 'tribalist', anti-government and satanic (cf. Ciekawy [2009]).

to bring youth and elderly leaders together, the patronage politics that they subsequently engage in often does not necessarily increase space for ideological deliberation or increase youth's economic independency, as British donors envision. In another article (Meinema 2020), I analyse in more detail how concerns about youth and violence intersect with the politics of managing religious co-existence and distributing donor funds. Crucial for my argument here is that preaching peace to youth allows CSOs in Malindi to circumvent the exclusive stigmatization of Muslim youth, and by extension Islam in general.

Conclusion

Although policy thinking behind BRICS does not explicitly focus on Islam, my research shows that it continues to carry a tacit distinction between 'moderate' Muslims who hold liberal values and need to be strengthened, and 'radical' Muslims who hold violent extremist ideologies and need to be countered. In this way, British CVE-policy is characterized by paradoxical features, that according to Mahmood more often haunt projects of political secularism. On the one hand, British policy-thinking considers the promotion of liberal values such as religious freedom a suitable strategy to counter violent extremism, and conceals a focus on Islam, possibly to avoid stigmatizing Muslims by maintaining a public stance of neutrality towards various religions. On the other hand, it conceptualizes Muslims as particularly 'at-risk' of violent extremism, which legitimizes policy and security interventions that focus on curbing the 'radical' religiosity of Muslims in particular, in cooperation with Kenyan state actors.

The article subsequently demonstrates how Muslim-led CSOs who implement BRICS in Malindi try to circumvent and challenge such thinking. They do so by mobilizing Islam as an essentially peaceful religion that contributes to peace, development, and national unity. In this way, these CSOs build on a longer tradition of political secularism in Kenya, in which various religions are mobilized to support nation-building and development. This means that Muslim-led CSOs that implement BRICS in Malindi have to strategically navigate potentially stigmatizing associations between Islam and violent extremism that are tacitly present in CVE-policy and Kenyan society. They do so by (1) avoiding direct conversations about violent extremism, (2) widening discussions on peace and security to include security concerns not (primarily) associated with Islam, and (3) tapping into broadly experienced concerns about the moral degradation of youth, that do not exclusively focus on Muslim youth.

The mobilization of Islam to preach peace and national unity allows Muslim-led CSOs to raise donor funds, and Muslim leaders to play public roles as religious leaders (*viongozi wa dini*) who provide guidance to society. Yet, the desire to present Islam as peaceful also strongly affects forms of Islamic mobilization in Malindi, because it limits possibilities to address widespread feelings of marginalization amongst Kenyan Muslims. This tendency can be observed in the opening vignette of this article, and should also be understood in relation to the securitization and politicization of Islam through 'hard power' counterterrorism approaches executed or condoned by the Kenyan state. In this context, Muslim criticism of excessive state violence, Western 'meddling' with Islam, or Muslim marginalization in general continually runs the risk of being read as

an indicator of violent extremism. On the other hand, Muslim-led CSOs that use British funds to preach peace and unity run the risk of angering Muslims who criticize Kenya's 'Christian state' or Western interference. As addressing violent extremism head-on is a sensitive endeavor, many leaders rather express concerns over youth instead, leading them to incorporate youth into NGO-programs to educate, support, and pacify them with food and 'transport' money. This can provide further challenges, as the position of (Muslim) youth at the bottom of patronage chains narrows their opportunities to constructively address the economic and political marginalization they experience in their daily lives.

List of acronyms

ATPU	Anti-Terror Police Unit
BRICS	Building Resilience In Civil Society
CSO	Civil Society Organization
CVE	Countering Violent Extremism
DAI	Development Alternatives Incorporated
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FCO	Foreign Commonwealth Office
KDF	Kenya Defence Forces
MRC	Mombasa Republican Council
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
USAID	The United States Agency for International Development

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