Women and Preventing Violent Extremism: The U.S. and U.K. Experiences

Introduction

In August 2011, the United States government (USG) released its first-ever strategy to "address ideologically inspired violent extremism in the Homeland."[1] The strategy, entitled *Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States (Empowering Local Partners)*,[2] adopts a community-based approach to building resilience against violent extremism that is premised on the National Security Strategy 2010 (NSS 2010) and its conclusion that "[o]ur best defenses against this threat are well informed and equipped families, local communities, and institutions."[3] In December 2011, the USG released its blueprint for operationalizing the strategy—the *Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States*.[4]

This briefing paper analyzes this new strategy from a gender and human rights perspective, drawing on the United Kingdom's (U.K.) experience with *Prevent*—one of the four strands of its counter-terrorism policy—to elucidate the uniquely gendered challenges and opportunities that arise when governments seek to prevent or counter violent extremism (CVE) domestically.[5] The U.K. experience is instructive both because of the extent to which the United States (and other countries) look to U.K. practices[6] and because until its revision in June 2011, *Prevent* took the distinctive approach of explicitly and broadly including women in its delivery partnerships and activities. While this briefing paper focuses on comparing the U.K. and U.S. approaches, many of the observations and lessons learned are generally applicable to other countries seeking to adopt preventive measures for countering terrorism that comply with their gender and human rights obligations.

The need for the USG and other governments to take such gender-sensitive approaches is acute. Over the last decade of the United States' "War on Terror," the oft-unspoken assumption that counter-terrorism disproportionately affects men—both numerically and in terms of the nature of rights violations endured—has obscured the way women (and sexual minorities) also experience counter-terrorism. This failure to consider either the differential human rights impacts of counter-terrorism on women and men—or the ways in which such measures use and affect gender stereotypes and relations—has created a series of gender blind spots. From the failure to mitigate the devastating impact of anti-terrorism financing laws on women's groups to the bartering of women's rights to appease terrorist groups to insufficient attention to female radicalization and under-developed approaches concerning the role of women in counter-terrorism efforts, these blind spots are untenable for both the human rights and national security agendas.

This briefing paper aims to chart the way forward on a gender and human rights approach to one aspect of preventive counter-terrorism policy by: briefly comparing the key elements of the new U.S. strategy with the U.K.'s pre- and post-June 2011 *Prevent* strategy (Section I); identifying both why and how the previous and current *Prevent* each approach women's empowerment and inclusion (Section II); and making a series of recommendations to the USG based on the gendered challenges and opportunities elucidated by the *Prevent* experience (Section III).

Methodology

In July 2011, the Center for Human Rights and Global Justice (CHRGJ) at New York University School of Law released its 163-page report, *A Decade Lost: Locating Gender in U.S. Counter-Terrorism*, examining the gender dimensions and impacts of U.S.

"*Prevent* must not assume control of or allocate funding to integration projects which have a value far wider than security and counter-terrorism: the Government will not securitise its integration strategy. This has been a mistake in the past."

- Secretary of State for the Home Department, *Prevent* Strategy, 2011.

"We must use a wide range of good governance programs—including those that promote immigrant integration and civic engagement, protect civil rights, and provide social services—that may help prevent radicalization that leads to violence."

- *Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States* (2011)

counter-terrorism policies domestically and abroad.[7] In addition to utilizing the primary and secondary research that informed *A Decade Lost*,[8] this briefing paper also draws on CHRGJ's investigation of the U.K. Government's (HMG) counter-terrorism strategy through interviews from February 21-28, 2011 in the United Kingdom with HMG officials, national security experts, NGO representatives, and HMG implementing partners. CHRGJ conducted on the record interviews with HMG officials in the Home Office, Department for International Development (DfID), Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG), Metropolitan Police (MET), Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO), Birmingham City Council, and the U.K. House of Lords. Information from these interviews as it appears in this briefing paper is attributed to the HMG official's departmental affiliation. Additional interviews were also conducted off the record. The information reflected in the interviews is current as at February 2011.

Section I: Overview of U.K. and U.S. Counter-Terrorism Strategies

Prevent in the United Kingdom

The U.K. government's counter-terrorism strategy (CONTEST) has four strands: *Pursue*, *Prevent*, *Protect* and *Prepare*.[9] According to the new four-year Prevent strategy released in June 2011, *Prevent* seeks "to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism"[10] and has three objectives: "respond to the ideological challenge of terrorism and the threat we face from those who promote it; prevent people from being drawn into terrorism and ensure that they are given appropriate advice and support; and work with a wide range of sectors and institutions...where there are risks of radicalisation..."[11] These priority sectors include the internet and "education, faith, health, criminal justice and charities"[12] and the three core areas of *Prevent* expenditure are "local projects, policing and *Prevent* work overseas."[13] The new strategy follows a *Prevent* review process from 2010 to 2011 that was independently overseen by Lord Carlile of Berriew[14] and initiated to move *Prevent* away from the controversy and flaws that beset its predecessor, including with regard to its negative impact on Muslim communities.[15] To this end, the new strategy notably:

- separates *Prevent* (to be led by the Home Office) from broader community integration and cohesion work (to be led by the DCLG);
- broadens *Prevent* to focus on all forms of terrorism while still targeting Al-Qaeda;
- cuts off *Prevent* funding and support to extremist organizations;
- emphasizes the government's role in countering ideology, including "non-violent extremism where it creates an environment conducive to terrorism and popularises ideas that are espoused by terrorist groups;" and
- introduces stricter oversight of *Prevent* delivery and expenditure.[16]

Empowering Local Partners in the United States

In contrast to the United Kingdom, until very recently the USG did not have a unified national strategy for addressing "ideologically inspired" violent extremism within the United States.[17] This situation changed in August 2011, when the USG released its new 8-page policy, *Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States*, followed by its December 2011 strategic implementation plan to provide a "blueprint for how we will build community resilience against violent extremism" domestically.[18]

The new policy makes clear that within the United States, the USG foregrounds the role of families and local communities and institutions over that of the Federal government, while at the same time adopting a whole-of-government approach that includes non-security actors, such as the U.S. Department of Education (EDU) and U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).[19] Officials rationalize that this "more holistic approach" enables the government to "skirt the problem of scapegoating or Islamophobia,"[20] by drawing on existing programs rather than creating new CVE-specific architecture.[21] Accordingly, under this approach: "The problem of a local Muslim schoolgirl being hassled for wearing a headscarf, or *hijab*, for example, could be easily addressed through the Department of Education's anti-bullying initiatives. 'There is no need to classify that as a Muslim problem; it is a schoolyard problem,' said one administration official."[22]

Relatedly, the strategy is also at pains to stress that it does not single out Muslim Americans—from guaranteeing to address all forms of violent extremism (while focusing on Al-Qaeda) to promising Muslim community engagement outside of the framework of national security to rejecting "strong religious beliefs" being equated with violent extremism and condemning those who "stigmatize or blame communities because of the actions of a handful of individuals."[23]

Taken together, the policy and its strategic implementation plan show the U.S. approach to be a mix of the U.K.'s old and new *Prevent* strategy (see *Table 1. Comparisons between U.K. and U.S. Strategies to Prevent Violent Extremism Domestically*).

Table 1. Comparisons between U.K. and U.S. Strategies to Prevent Violent Extremism Domestically

Policy Feature	U.K. *Prevent* pre-June 2011	U.K. *Prevent* June 2011	U.S. *Empowering Local Partners*
Community resilience and initiatives core part of counter-terrorism	Yes	No	Yes
Funding, support and/or engagement with extremist organizations	Yes	Mixed. Funding and support no, engagement yes.[24]	Unclear. Will be "[l]earning from former violent extremists."[25]
Government has role in countering ideology	Yes (to "challenge the ideology behind violent extremism and support mainstream voices")[26]	Yes (including non-violent extremism)[27]	Yes ("[c]ountering violent extremist propaganda while promoting our ideals")[28]
Whole-of-government approach to countering violent extremism, including non-security actors	Yes	Yes (no longer DCLG but a greater role for other public service professionals)[29]	Yes
Addresses all forms of extremism	No	Yes but focuses on Al-Qaeda and affiliates	Yes but focuses on Al-Qaeda and affiliates
Explicit focus on engaging women, women's organizations and/or issues in preventive efforts	Yes	No	No

Section II: Why and How Does Gender Feature in *Prevent*?

Prevent pre-June 2011

Up until its June 2011 revision, *Prevent* had a transparent and explicit focus on the role of Muslim women in CVE efforts. While the rationale for this focus varied somewhat across government departments, women's inclusion was often conceptualized in relation to one or more of *Prevent*'s then-five objectives: to challenge violent ideology and "support mainstream voices;" disrupt recruitment activities; support those vulnerable to recruitment through interventions; build community resilience; and "address grievances exploited in the radicalisation process."[30] According to a former ACPO *Prevent* liaison officer, women's *Prevent* projects pre-June 2011 particularly engaged three of these five *Prevent* objectives: challenging the ideology of violent extremism and supporting mainstream voices; enhancing communities' resilience to violent extremism; and addressing grievances.[31] These different rationales and the kinds of activities they spurred are outlined below:

- Women build resilient communities: The bulk of women *Prevent* activities were in furtherance of this then-objective of *Prevent*. According to the DCLG, women's leadership and participation enhances communities' resistance to violent extremism, such that: "Resilient communities cannot be built and sustained without the active participation of women."[32] A former ACPO *Prevent* liaison officer notes that from 2007 onward both DCLG and ACPO increased their engagement with Muslim women under the banner of *Prevent*, with ACPO's focus being as follows: "While a small number of women's projects have successfully discussed some *Prevent* issues and the root causes of radicalization the majority of women's projects have tended to focus on areas such as community barriers, access to services, education and the arts."[33] Such programs are considered to have been more successful than those concerned with improving women's response to terrorism, such as Operation Nicole and All Communities Together Now (ACT NOW).[34] For other women's activities developed pursuant to the broader objectives of *Prevent* pre-June 2011, see *Box 1. Examples of DCLG, ACPO and FCO* Prevent *Activities Focused on Women.*

- Women provide mainstream voices to challenge ideology: For example, DCLG's engagement with Muslim women through *Prevent* draws upon the rationale that supporting mainstream voices to challenge violent extremist ideology requires looking beyond community gatekeepers and realizing that "[w]omen can be a particularly effective voice as they are at the heart not only of their communities but also of their families..."[35] While the bulk of *Prevent*'s counter-narrative or counter-ideological work is coordinated by the Research, Information and Communications Unit (under both the old and new forms of *Prevent*) in the Home Office,[36] FCO also described one of its two *Prevent* objectives pre-June 2011 as "challenging the ideologies that extremists use to justify violence by helping people who wish to dispute these ideas to do so."[37] This includes activities such as "Projecting British Muslims" by which delegations of British Muslims travel abroad (e.g., to Afghanistan) "to dispel and challenge misconceptions of life as a British Muslim, the compatibility of Islam in Western society and the cultural religious freedom that exists within the UK"[38] and conversely "Bringing foreign policy back home" (through discussions with local Muslim communities about U.K. foreign policies).[39] The "Projecting British Muslims" project includes women delegates.[40] However, it should also be noted that as at February 2011, the U.K. government—as with the USG[41]—had not specifically engaged with Al-Qaeda propaganda on women in these counter-narrative and other efforts, but instead addressed the propaganda as a whole.[42]

- Gender issues are a part of addressing grievances that drive radicalization: According to the Home Office, one example of where *Prevent* activities addressed a gendered grievance was with respect to the treatment of individuals at airports, where the government had to engage with Muslim

communities to explain the use of body scanners at airports and its impact on women.[43]

In addition to realizing these *Prevent* objectives, government departments and partners also conceptualized the role of women in *Prevent* as follows:

- *Prevent* as an opportunity to correct the exclusion of women's voices: For ACPO, this engagement was premised on the fact that preceding outreach had focused on male leaders and places of worship to the exclusion of the community safety issues pertaining to women and youth and that engaging through *Prevent* would enable ACPO to "raise the voice of women within vulnerable communities and kick start or raise the level of engagement where it was previously poor or non-existent."[44] The Metropolitan Police and the DCLG's engagement with Muslim women through *Prevent* also draws upon the rationale that the voices of Muslim women are often not accessed.[45]
- Women's capacity to intervene in radicalization processes as mothers: In CHRGJ's interviews with *Prevent* departments and partners it was repeatedly stressed that *Prevent*'s engagement with women was based on the fact that women have a major role in their families and are most likely to spot and influence changes in their children's behavior,[46] but may not have the confidence or access (e.g., to police) to share these concerns.[47] According to the DCLG, Muslim women have a "unique viewpoint

Box. 1 Examples of DCLG, ACPO and FCO *Prevent* Activities Focused on Women

Some of the activities supported by DCLG, ACPO and FCO include:

- DCLG: has focused on supporting Muslim women, along with Muslim faith leaders and Muslim youth, through both direct grants to community organizations and through a substantial grant to local authorities.[59] In January 2008, the DCLG established the National Muslim Women's Advisory Group (NMWAG) to "act as role models and represent the views and concerns of Muslim women."[60] DCLG has also supported empowerment programs to prevent violent extremism: e.g., Hounslow Leadership Training, Muslim Women's Community Leadership Training Project run by Sizanani Africa, and The Muslimah-Make a Difference project.[61] The Preventing Violent Extremism Community Leadership Fund has also funded Faith Matters to provide a "UK tour of Muslim women role models from the US"[62] and to "compile a directory of the 100 leading mosques that provide the best access to women…[t]he ultimate aim is to incentivise mosques to improve their engagement and inclusion of women in all aspects of their work…"[63]
- ACPO: From 2009 to 2010, the ACPO *Prevent* Delivery Unit developed and implemented programming with Muslim women that included internet safety programs; funding training (that assisted women's groups to apply for funds from trusts and statutory bodies); radicalization awareness training for women's groups (with the Quilliam Foundation); and women's leadership training.[64] ACPO hosted the first Women's *Prevent* Network event on December 18, 2009.[65] As at February 2011, the ACPO *Prevent* Delivery Unit continued to focus on women as one of its four core areas of engagement.[66]
- FCO: The FCO has also funded a number of women's projects under *Prevent*. For example, FCO's *Prevent* grants in 2008-09 included funding to Pattan (for "Pattan Women's Councillors training"); International Research and Exchanges Board (for "[redacted] young women's leadership program"); Action Aid (for "Women Affecting Change Action Aid"); and BBC (for "[redacted] Women's Hour").[67] The second largest FCO *Prevent* grant in 2008-09 was to the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) for: "Building social cohesion, harmony, moderation and security in the Arab region as an antidote to radicalization and extremism."[68]

on the challenges faced by the communities they live in—whether that is the threat of violent extremism, anti-social behaviour, or young people feeling isolated and disengaged. They are also uniquely placed to solve these problems, challenging unacceptable behaviour and supporting those in need."[48] According to the ACPO *Prevent* Delivery Unit, the U.K. government's approach is "not asking women to spy on their communities," but is instead "asking them to be aware of radicalization."[49]

- Addressing female radicalization and recruitment of women: According to the Home Office, there is not a specific focus on women in CONTEST (including in *Prevent*) and there is no specific policy position on women in radicalization, however if the Countering Terrorism evidence base (developed within the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT)) reflected an increased role of women in terrorism, the Home Office would also increase its focus.[50] According to the Quilliam Foundation (an organization that has received *Prevent* funding), given that the primary focus of its trainings (including those that take place for example, with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement and with activities with the Somali community in the United States) is on radicalization in the Western world, gender does not feature prominently in understanding and addressing the drivers of violent extremism.[51] The Muslim Contact Unit at the MET notes that in respect of women and radicalization, while there is a need to create safe spaces where conversations (e.g., about *jihad*) can take place naturally, there is also a challenge in getting female Muslim scholars involved in such efforts.[52]

  However, there are two efforts that focus on the radicalization of women: a female intervention program and work with families of those convicted of terrorism-related offences to install a level of resilience and reduce isolation so that the family unit is not vulnerable to radicalization, including when the family member returns from prison.[53] Through the latter, Families Against Stress and Trauma (FAST), provides families with assistance such as language, sewing and IT classes, employment assistance, and more generally reduces social marginalization of wives and children and seeks to educate on vulnerabilities to terrorism.[54] According to ACPO, the potential for women to be terrorists is also addressed through programs such as Operation Nicole, Operation Hindsight, and ACT NOW,[55] which are activities designed to have participants (including women's groups) simulate a counter-terrorism investigation and get greater insights into decision-making by police.[56]

- Focus on women is community-driven: According to the Birmingham City Council, its *Prevent* activities that engaged women emerged after a series of community consultations about what projects should be addressed through *Prevent*.[57] The Birmingham City Council funds projects such as "Big Sister" (spotlighting "successful Muslim females…to make local role models more accessible to thousands of Muslim girls in Birmingham") and "Women and Youth PVE Awareness Project" in the Bangladeshi community.[58]

Prevent post-June 2011

The extent to which the new version of *Prevent* takes a gender-sensitive approach is mixed as follows:

- Gender as a litmus test of British values informing the new *Prevent* strategy: In the new *Prevent* strategy, gender equality is referenced as symptomatic of British values and conversely, gender inequality is identified as indicative of dangerous ideologies and institutions where there are risks of radicalization. For example, according to the revised *Prevent* strategy:

  > Challenging ideology is also about being confident in our own values—the values of democracy, rule of law, *equality of opportunity*, freedom of speech and the *rights of all men and women to live free from persecution of any kind*. Challenge must be accompanied by advocacy of the very systems and values which terrorists in this country and elsewhere set out to destroy" (emphasis added).[69]

  In its focus on the risk of youth being radicalized, the new *Prevent* strategy similarly

refers to "allegations that a minority of independent faith schools have been actively promoting views that are contrary to British values, such as intolerance of other cultures and *gender inequality*" (emphasis added).[70]

- Narrowing of *Prevent* funding for women's groups and empowerment because of the shift away from community integration and resilience strategies under new *Prevent*: When CHRGJ interviewed Lord Carlile—independent overseer of the *Prevent* review—in February 2011, he anticipated that the outcome of the *Prevent* review would stress two things: "choosing friends" and "stepping up to the plate."[71] According to Lord Carlile, both of these areas would increase the involvement and empowerment of Muslim women and women's groups because women are more moderate, non-violent and have the appearance of more neutrality in ways that make them "safe friends" for the government.[72] In addition, Lord Carlile proposed that there should be a pre-evaluation of *Prevent* projects using a matrix which *inter alia* considers the effect on women.[73] However, given that most of *Prevent*'s previous engagement with women took place under the rubric of building community resilience (see above), the new strategy's separation of community engagement from *Prevent* is likely to signal the curtailment of funds for women's groups and activities. For example, according to the *Prevent* review "...in the past, the FCO funded activity overseas that aimed to build community resilience and support wider cohesion goals (for example English language training for imams or empowering Muslim women). We do not believe this work is effective in *Prevent* terms and the focus has since moved."[74]

- Disproportionately negative impact of *Prevent* on young males and potentially mixed impacts on women: According to the Equality Impact Assessment (EIA) undertaken for the *Prevent* 2011 review, there is "some qualitative evidence to suggest that age and gender had also been impacted to an extent by the strategy in terms of perceived impact on young males."[75] In terms of anticipated gender impacts of the new *Prevent* strategy, the online consultation revealed mixed results. While the majority of respondents (78%) did not think that the strategy would have a negative impact on gender, the majority (77%) also did not anticipate a positive impact either, with results indicating that it was "overwhelmingly felt that men would be most negatively impacted by the *Prevent* strategy on the basis that they are perceived to be at greatest risk of radicalisation."[76] The EIA itself concludes that: "It is recognised that young people and young men in particular are more vulnerable to the risks associated with terrorism. Given this, there *may continue to be a perception of disproportionate impact on young men under the new strategy*" (emphasis added).[77]

  On the question of *Prevent*'s impact on women previously and moving forward, the EIA's online consultation similarly received varied responses:

  > A smaller group felt that women have been negatively impacted by virtue of perceptions (underlying in the strategy) of male dominance and more should be done to redress the balance. However, there was also the view that it is difficult to reach into some groups without encountering gender issues. For example, *Prevent* aimed at women could be seen as an attempt to undermine traditional relationships between genders within certain cultures. Conversely, some respondents felt that *Prevent* had had a positive impact on women. Some perceived that women are not treated equally within some groups and *Prevent* had the potential to remove the constraints that block their participation in the agenda, by empowering them to tackle intolerance and play a more active role in society.[78]

- Gender in new tools to monitor and evaluate *Prevent* delivery: Pursuant to the U.K.'s revised *Prevent* strategy, the OSCT in the Home Office will "put in place a Case Management Information System to monitor

data," including the gender, race, religion/belief, and age, "of all individuals subject to *Prevent* interventions."[79] Such data will be "reviewed regularly and used as a basis for further research and to evaluate delivery of the refreshed strategy."[80]

Section III: Lessons from the U.K. Experience for the United States

The new USG strategy and its strategic implementation plan are devoid of any reference to gender. To some extent, this is not surprising—earlier USG efforts to engage with domestic Muslim communities "that are being targeted by terrorist recruiters"[81] were similarly gender-blind. According to CHRGJ's April 2011 interview with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Community Relations Unit, community-engagement activities are not explicitly undertaken with a gender lens; for example, there is not an explicit focus on reaching out to women or considering gender in program design.[82] This silence on gender in the new strategy is out of step with the NSS 2010 which identifies the promotion of women's rights as key to U.S. national security.[83]

"Muslim women in America wearing a headscarf have become both visible and vulnerable targets."

- Sahar Aziz, Texas Wesleyan University School of Law & Institute for Social Policy and Understanding

"The problem of a local Muslim schoolgirl being hassled for wearing a headscarf, or *hijab*, for example, could be easily addressed through the Department of Education's anti-bullying initiatives. 'There is no need to classify that as a Muslim problem; it is a schoolyard problem,' said one administration official."

- National Public Radio

Moreover, the failure to adopt a gender-sensitive approach to USG efforts to prevent violent extremism in the United States leads to a litany of human rights and security problems further identified below. Many of the steps needed to mitigate these negative gendered impacts are those that are generally necessary to ensure that counter-terrorism is human rights compliant. These steps range from ensuring that USG counter-terrorism policies cease to locate the problem of terrorism in Muslim communities, to increasing transparency and accountability in counter-terrorism actions. However, a gender perspective elucidates new challenges and opportunities that these steps will inevitably entail, enabling tailored recommendations that ensure that counter-terrorism efforts—particularly in the preventive paradigm—impact and include women in ways that respect rather than undermine their human rights and the human rights of affected communities more broadly. Drawing on a gender and human rights perspective and the U.K. *Prevent* experience, these specific recommendations to the USG include:

- Fully acknowledge and address the role of counter-terrorism policies in the rise of Islamophobia and its impact on increasing Muslim women's insecurity in the United States. Some of the major critiques of old *Prevent* is that it focused solely on Muslim communities; did not tackle all forms of extremism and may actually have incentivized them; securitized the government's engagement with Muslim communities; viewed religious observance as inherently criminal; stigmatized and increased discrimination against Muslim communities; unduly focused on the theological dimensions of the drivers of radicalization; and sought to engineer a version of "moderate" Islam through supporting groups that fit that model.[84]

There is a gender dimension to these critiques, with young Muslim women in the United Kingdom disproportionately bearing the brunt of increased anti-Muslim racism and discrimination that flows from such policies.[85] The scrutiny of Muslim, Arab and South Asian (MASA) communities in the United States has similarly caused significant discrimination, violence and backlash against Muslim women—particularly those wearing a headscarf—that is very often unacknowledged.[86] In a situation where "Muslim women in America wearing a headscarf have become both visible and vulnerable targets,"[87] a U.S. CVE strategy that seeks to solely view attacks on Muslim school girls wearing the hijab as a "schoolyard problem" rather than a "Muslim problem"[88] will in many cases misdiagnose the issue, silence the prejudice experienced by Muslim women and girls, and perpetuate insecurity.

Further, such a strategy—that relies heavily on existing violence prevention and public safety programs[89]—overlooks how post-9/11 counter-terrorism policies have reduced the viability of such programs for immigrant women. For example, U.S. counter-terrorism efforts that have increased law enforcement's coordination with immigration authorities, have further deterred immigrant women from reporting crimes, such as domestic violence and trafficking, because of fear of drawing undue attention to themselves and family members.[90] One case that exemplifies this concern occurred in February 2009, when police officers responding to a domestic violence call asked that everyone at the scene provide proof of citizenship.[91] The caller, who had bruises on her neck, asked the officers to arrest her boyfriend, but instead they arrested her sister because she was unable to prove her citizenship.[92] In these circumstances, more effort is required to ensure that these existing programs are themselves gender and human rights protective in ways that enable women to access them safely.

- Ensure rigorous and gender-sensitive safeguards around USG's activities to enhance "community resilience" and "use a wide range good governance programs—including those that promote immigrant integration and civic engagement, protect civil rights, and provide social services..."[93] One of the core outcomes of the 2011 *Prevent* review was that *Prevent* should be refocused to "make a clearer distinction between our counter-terrorist work and our integration strategy" because "[f]ailure to appreciate the distinction risks securitising integration and reducing the chances of our success."[94] From a gender and human rights perspective, this shift is significant. When integration activities are blurred with counter-terrorism and Muslim communities are only engaged on counter-terrorism issues, women's insecurity abounds—including because social services become even more off-limits due to the risk of bringing themselves or family members under the purview of counter-terrorism efforts and because women bear the brunt of an environment marked by increased anti-Muslim prejudice.[95]

  By adopting the concept of "community resilience" recently rejected by the U.K. government, the new U.S. strategy risks these and other adverse effects, including for example, that communities will be less likely to trust and co-operate with law enforcement.[96] The new U.S. strategy partly acknowledges this challenge, stating for example that the strategy's involvement of non-security partners such as EDU and HHS "does not mean the missions and priorities of these partners will change or that their efforts will become narrowly focused on national security."[97] However, the U.S. strategy does not provide any concrete guidance on how this will be achieved. As a starting point, the USG should, for example, clearly and comprehensively define what is meant by "community resilience"[98] and put in place specific steps to ensure that "good governance" programs will not be co-opted by the national security agenda or used for surveillance purposes (see further below). This would include, for example, making public the selection criteria for local partners and conditions on which local partners are funded, ensuring that such criteria explicitly

reject alleged *Prevent* practices, such as making funding contingent on collecting information for law enforcement.[99]

- Ensure that community engagement is not used as a pretext for surveillance efforts and that affected individuals are provided a meaningful opportunity to have concerns about government actions heard and addressed. As indicated above, one of the major critiques of *Prevent* was that the U.K. government used community outreach as a basis to surveill Muslim communities.[100] This concern is also preeminent in the United States in light of information that between 2007 and 2009, the FBI sometimes used Muslim community outreach programs to improperly collect intelligence on those who attended.[101] It has been surmised that such surveillance "may explain why individuals, including imams, who were active participants in government outreach programs have found themselves indicted or deported, sending a chill through Muslim communities."[102] Significantly, the new U.S. strategy occurs against a backdrop where: attendance at community outreach programs has had these adverse consequences; some community advocates dismiss FBI engagement efforts on the basis that they "have only opened the doors to allow informants into the community;"[103] and surveillance and investigatory powers have been used extensively against MASA communities[104]—all of which has adverse flow-on effects for women, including as female family members of those directly impacted.[105]

  While the USG may have hoped that supporting community-led initiatives would obviate concerns about it spying on communities,[106] much more is required to regain community trust and ensure community engagement complies with relevant U.S. laws, including those related to *Privacy Act* protections.[107] Accordingly, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) is "urging the FBI to stop using community outreach for intelligence purposes, to be honest with community organizations regarding what information is collected and retained during community outreach meetings and to purge all improperly collected information."[108] Another starting point—reflected in principle in the strategy—is to ensure that the public has an opportunity to share complaints about government conduct without recrimination and that such complaints are meaningfully addressed.[109] This includes providing redress for the different ways in which U.S. counter-terrorism to date has adversely impacted men and women both in the United States and abroad.[110]

- Ensure that the new strategy does not further securitize engagement with Muslim communities in the United States. The U.K. experience demonstrates that community engagement on the basis of faith and through the lens of national security increases the insecurity of Muslim women[111] and from a CVE perspective, circumscribes the options for productively engaging women as local partners. For example, in the United Kingdom, according to a former ACPO *Prevent* liaison officer, women "were either suspicious of the *Prevent* agenda or suffered from community pressure to not partake in overt *Prevent* activity."[112] In addition, according to Ulfah Arts, engaging women on a faith-related basis caused confusion and resentment because "whoever gets funded everybody else is thinking, 'they have been funded because of this, that or the other' and there is this conversation around Muslim women who are supported are women who wear hijab, not the women who do not wear hijab."[113] According to the MET Muslim Contact Unit, police efforts to engage with Muslim women for counter-terrorism purposes are often met with suspicion and seen as an intrusion.[114] While the new U.S. strategy clearly promises broader engagement with a broader set of communities in the United States, the fact that the strategy remains focused on Al-Qaeda requires vigilance in ensuring that the securitization of engagement with Muslim communities does not characterize its implementation and that the adverse gendered flow-on effects from such securitization are averted.

- Ensure that the USG does not support individuals and/or organizations inimical to human rights, particularly women's rights. As briefly mentioned above, until June 2011, the U.K.'s *Prevent* strategy explicitly relied on partnerships with non-violent extremists to combat violent extremism.[115] From a gender perspective, one of the critiques of this approach—now firmly rejected in the new *Prevent* strategy[116]—was that "ethnic minority women may become more vulnerable because *Prevent* and cohesion policy puts more power and authority into the hands of religious leaders and interfaith networks."[117] In addition to concerns that the U.K. government was partnering with the wrong organizations, it was also argued that *Prevent* diverted funding from specialist women's organizations to mainstream organizations with ramifications for Black and Minority Ethnic (BME) women.[118]

  These observations are pertinent to the USG's approach given that the strategic implementation plan references, but does not fully explore, plans to ensure "[l]earning from former violent extremists, specifically those who can speak credibly to counter violent narratives, provide insights to government, and potentially catalyze activities to directly challenge violent extremist narratives."[119] Moreover, a key finding of *A Decade Lost* is that the USG's local partnerships—particularly those abroad—for CVE purposes often exclude women's voices and involve supporting individuals and/or organizations inimical to human rights, particularly women's rights.[120] To mitigate this moving forward, the USG should, for example, introduce criteria for partner selection that support proposals by women's groups and/or on issues affecting women, as well as vet potential partners based on their approaches to human rights and civil liberties.[121] For example, following the recent *Prevent* review, it has been determined that "public money will not be provided to extremist organisations who do not support the values of democracy, human rights, the rule of law and mutual respect and tolerance of different faith groups."[122] While these are important developments, it will also be critical to ensure that any such due diligence processes do not rely on the very racial, religious and gender stereotypes that have stigmatized communities to date (e.g., such as the notions that Islam oppresses women and women are more peaceful than men) with negative flow-on effects for women in these communities.[123]

The Cincinnati Division—in partnership with the U.S. Attorney's Offices for the Northern and Southern Districts of Ohio, along with the Columbus Police Department—recently hosted a radicalization awareness presentation for more than 100 members of the Somali community, including students, parents, and community leaders. On the second day of the event, more than 200 members of local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies attended a second presentation, held at the Columbus Police Training Academy. Original Caption

- Conduct meaningful and inclusive community consultations about what projects should be addressed in the new U.S. strategy. To the extent that *Prevent* did promote women's empowerment and inclusion, it in many respects failed to do so in ways that would ensure full representation of women's concerns. For example, female participation in events like Operation Nicole was low due to the fact that women were not invited, did not always feel comfortable enough to attend, and because of the lack of child care facilities and interpreters.[124] In addition, the U.K. experience also demonstrates that it would be advisable for the USG to require tracking of partners and projects to ensure women are being properly engaged across the spectrum. For example, in 2007, the DCLG set up NMWAG to assist with *Prevent*, however,

much criticism was made of its limited representativeness[125] and its inability to influence government policy.[126] In contrast to having women's groups act as a "rubber-stamp" for *Prevent* activities,[127] *Prevent* programs that were based around direct consultation with grassroots women's groups were perceived to have fared better.[128] For example, to this end, the Metropolitan Police designed a survey for women (e.g., Somali women) to identify their preferred needs and services and, based on the results, organized self-defense and first-aid training as a means of basic engagement with the community.[129]

- Ensure transparency in all activities to counter violent extremism, including in community engagement efforts. According to the Metropolitan Police, it is important when engaging with women under the *Prevent* rubric, to be upfront about the roles and responsibilities of the police and communities in preventing terrorism.[130] Indeed, the U.K. experience demonstrates that when individuals interface with agencies or local partners (including, e.g., to access social services), secrecy around the connection of these interactions to CVE has a widespread chilling effect that erodes community trust. For example, An-Nisa Society, "a women managed organisation working for the welfare of Muslim families" in the United Kingdom, notes that the receipt of *Prevent* money can taint organizations' relationship with their constituencies, undermining the very trust and expectations of confidence that are key to the engagement efforts promoted by the government,[131] not to mention to those services (e.g., in domestic violence cases) such organizations provide to those in need. When individuals feel wholly discouraged from accessing all services for fear of exposing themselves and family members to undue scrutiny, this chilling effect undermines individual and community welfare as well as the U.S. national security objectives defined in its current strategy.

  Further, such a lack of transparency frustrates the ability of government and civil society to assess whether such activities comply with relevant laws. As the U.S. strategy itself notes, the USG is veering into difficult legal territory in its effort to counter ideologies that lead to violence, characterizing this work as "central to our effort, but it also is the most challenging area of work, requiring careful consideration of a number of legal issues, especially those related to the First Amendment."[132] These First Amendment concerns are particularly acute in light of the fact that the strategy is nebulous on the exact link between extreme beliefs and violence, leaving key terms such as "radicalization to violence" undefined.[133] As noted by the ACLU, the strategy's "true test will be the level of transparency the government provides into who it is monitoring and why, and whether law enforcement activities comply with the Constitution and our laws."[134]

- Value women's empowerment and engagement as a goal in and of itself, irrespective of whether it achieves national security outcomes. The U.K. experience embodies both the short-term opportunities and the long-term dangers of promoting women's engagement solely as a means to achieve *Prevent* objectives. On one level, the old *Prevent*'s blurring of community cohesion and counter-terrorism—as adopted in the new U.S. strategy—can be argued to have benefitted women. It was a key entry point for women's groups to receive funding for activities they might already be undertaking and for which they needed more resources. It would be difficult to see how a narrower version of *Prevent* would, for example, have enabled *Prevent* money to be given to a "Joining Hands Against Forced Marriage" project.[135] It has also been argued that *Prevent* funding for women's projects enhanced the visibility of Muslim women and networks;[136] created a safe space for women to talk about extremism and empowered Muslim women;[137] enabled women's groups to form community networks that will not survive if *Prevent* funding to these groups is cut;[138] and enabled women's groups to identify community needs.[139]

However, the basis on which this engagement takes place is also determinative as to whether empowerment and inclusion is ensured in the long term. A concern in the United Kingdom is that *Prevent*'s engagement with Muslim women was instrumentalizing, risking that Muslim women's "activism will become increasingly associated with the government agenda of counter-radicalisation" and therefore "relegating Muslim women's political activism to a sideshow."[140] For example, according to The Muslim Women's Network UK (MWN-UK): "Muslim women are being used by government" and there is a "concern that the skills of Muslim women are being built up to 'spy' on their families rather than participate fully in society and overcome barriers they face."[141] Instead, according to the ACPO *Prevent* Delivery Unit, women's empowerment should "not be patronizing but instead empowerment because it's the right thing to do."[142] The same observation applies with respect to providing assistance to families whose family members have been convicted of terrorism-related offenses, for whom support should be provided not just because it may be seen as a means to counter radicalization, but because counter-terrorism actions directed at a terrorism suspect should not collectively penalize his/her family.[143]

- Ensure that the U.S. strategy (e.g., in its focus on families) rejects harmful gender stereotypes such as those that unduly emphasize the role of women as moderate voices and/or mothers in CVE efforts.[144] In the United Kingdom, the rationale for engaging Muslim women in *Prevent* often reflected a series of gendered and racialized stereotypes about: Muslim women's educative role in their families; Muslim women as moderate (the "good liberal Muslim woman"); Muslim women as more "British" than Muslim men; and Muslim women as inherently disempowered by Islam.[145] Such stereotypes can be "patronizing", undermining Muslim women in their efforts to combat violent extremism[146] and/or lead to their inclusion in ways that perpetuate these stereotypes, such as focusing on the role of women as mothers to combat terrorism or portraying women as inherently peaceful.[147] While the new U.S. strategy is silent on the role of women, other areas of U.S. counter-terrorism have a mixed record on the rationale by which they seek to include women in national security efforts. While some USG statements recognize that women are agents and drivers of change in their communities, in other cases, the USG similarly relies on the stereotype that women are inherently more peaceful and moderate influences as the basis for seeking their inclusion.[148] The role of mothers—both as a positive or negative influence—in preventing terrorism is also a recurring aspect of the USG's linking of women and national security.[149] Instead, the USG should move toward an approach that recognizes the full range of ways in which women are involved in both terrorism and counter-terrorism activities.[150]

> "[T]he skills of Muslim women are being built up to 'spy' on their families rather than participate fully in society and overcome barriers they face."
> - The Muslim Women's Network UK (MWN-UK)

- Track gender in the monitoring and evaluation of programs under the new U.S. strategy. The recent review and reissuance of the U.K.'s *Prevent* strategy noted that "[e]valuating preventative programmes is inherently challenging. Success is often reflected in changing attitudes as much as behaviours, attitudes which are complex to measure and assess" and concluded that there has been "limited quality control" of *Prevent* activity.[151] The USG has similarly faced this challenge of how to measure the inputs, outputs, and particularly the outcomes, of counter-terrorism efforts.[152] From a gender and human rights perspective, compounding this general challenge of "quality control," is the USG's failure to integrate gender into those limited counter-terrorism and CVE measurement and evaluative tools that do exist. It is striking, for example, that in no domestic or international counter-terrorism program surveyed for *A Decade Lost* had the USG mandated collection and reporting on

sex-disaggregated indicators in its outputs and outcomes. This failure is unsustainable; as a starting point, the USG should emulate the revised U.K. approach pursuant to which OSCT will track gender "of all individuals subject to *Prevent* interventions."[153] More generally, gender tools (e.g., using gender targets or set-asides to ensure women's participation; applying gender markers to code how successful a program is at ensuring the advancement of gender equality; and including gender-sensitive indicators in project solicitations) should be integrated at every stage of an activity—from planning to implementation, monitoring, and evaluation—to help elucidate the full range of gendered dimensions and impacts of CVE efforts.[154]

About the Authors

The Center for Human Rights and Global Justice (CHRGJ) brings together and expands the rich array of teaching, research, clinical, internship, and publishing activities undertaken within New York University School of Law on international human rights issues. The Global Justice Clinic (GJC) at NYU School of Law provides high quality, professional human rights lawyering services to individual clients and non-governmental and inter-governmental human rights organizations, partnering with groups based in the United States and abroad. Principal authors and researchers of *A Decade Lost: Locating Gender in U.S. Counter-Terrorism*: Jayne Huckerby (Project Director) and Lama Fakih (Project Manager). *Women and Preventing Violent Extremism: The U.S. and U.K. Experiences* is based on CHRGJ/GJC's research in 2010-2012 and is authored by Jayne Huckerby.

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Endnotes

1 White House, Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States 6 (2011), *available at* www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/sip-final.pdf [hereinafter Empowering Local Partners SIP].

2 White House, Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States (2011), *available at* http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/empowering_local_partners.pdf [hereinafter *Empowering Local Partners*].

3 *Id.*, at 1 (referencing White House, National Security Strategy 19 (2010), *available at* www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/.../national_security_strategy.pdfSimilar [hereinafter NSS 2010]). *See also* Denis McDonough, Deputy Nat'l Sec. Advisor to the President, *Partnering with Communities to Prevent Violent Extremism in America* (Mar. 6, 2011), *available at* http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/06/remarks-denismcdonough-deputy-national-security-advisor-president-prepa [hereinafter *Partnering with Communities to Prevent Violent Extremism in America*].

4 Empowering Local Partners SIP, *supra* note 1, at 2 (noting that the SIP is domestically focused and "does not address our overseas CVE [countering violent extremism] efforts, other than ensuring we coordinate domestic and international activities.").

5 *See generally* Empowering Local Partners SIP, *supra* note 1 (using the expressions "preventing violent extremism" and "countering violent extremism (CVE)" interchangeably). *See* Secretary of State for the Home Department, Prevent Strategy, 2011, Cm. 8092 25 (U.K.), *available at* http://www.homeoffice.gov.ukpublications/counter-terrorism/prevent/prevent-strategy/prevent-strategy-review?view=Binary [hereinafter *Prevent* Strategy] (noting the that unlike its predecessor, the new *Prevent* strategy will "avoid using the phrase ["violent extremism"] here, although we recognise that programmes comparable to *Prevent* are being run in other countries under the banner of preventing or countering violent extremism.").

6 *See, e.g.*, Empowering Local Partners SIP, *supra* note 1, at 13; *U.S. Government's Efforts to Counter Violent Extremism, Testimony Before the Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on Armed Forces*, 112th Cong. (2010) (statement of Daniel Benjamin, Coordinator, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism), *available at* http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/rm/2010/138175.htm ("we hope to gain greater understanding of the UK's experience with countering violent extremism as well as how the U.S. government can create effective, locally-targeted programs and enhance its efforts to counter extremist narratives.").

7 CHRGJ, A Decade Lost: Locating Gender in U.S. Counter-Terrorism (2011), *available at* http://www.chrgj.org/projects/docs/locatinggender.pdf [hereinafter A Decade Lost].

8 *A Decade Lost* represents the culmination of more than three years of research, which included hosting regional stakeholder workshops with civil society actors in the United States, Africa, Asia, and the Middle East and North Africa; scores of interviews with USG officials (in Washington D.C. and in the field, including with the Department of State, Department of Defense, U.S. Agency for International Development, Department of Homeland Security, Department of the Treasury, and Department of Justice), foreign government officials, USG implementing partners, inter-governmental entities (including the U.N.), community advocates, non-governmental organizations and academics; and extensive secondary research in English, Arabic, and French.

9 *See* Secretary of State for the Home Department, Contest: The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering Terrorism, 2011, Cm. 8123 40 (U.K.), *available at* http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/ [hereinafter Contest].

10 *Prevent* Strategy, *supra* note 5, at 23. *See also* Home Affairs Committee, Roots of Violent Radicalization ¶¶ 49-88 (2012), available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmhaff/1446/144602.htm [hereinafter Roots of Violent Radicalization] (reviewing the new *Prevent* strategy).

11 *Prevent* Strategy, *supra* note 5, at 40.

12 *Id.* at 63.

13 *Id.* at 24.

14 *Id.* at 11; Lord Carlile, Report to the Home Secretary of Independent Oversight of Prevent Review and Strategy, 2011, H.L. (U.K.), *available at* http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/counterterrorism/prevent/prevent-strategy/lord-carlile-report?view=Binary [hereinafter Independent Oversight of Prevent Review and Strategy].

15 *See, e.g.*, *Prevent* Strategy, *supra* note 5, at 1 ("The *Prevent* programme we inherited from the last Government was flawed. It confused the delivery of Government policy to promote integration with Government policy to prevent terrorism. It failed to confront the extremist ideology at the heart of the threat we face; and in trying to reach those at risk of radicalisation, funding sometimes even reached the very extremist organisations that *Prevent* should have been confronting."); 31 ("But one of the most damaging allegations made about *Prevent* in the last two years has been that it has strayed into the area of *Pursue* and become a means for spying on Muslim communities."). *See also* Communities and Local Government Committee, Preventing Violent Extremism, 2009-10, H.C. 65 3 (U.K.), *available at* http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmcomloc/65/65.pdf [hereinafter Preventing Violent Extremism] ("The current breadth of focus of Prevent—from community work to crime prevention—sits uncomfortably within a counter-terrorism strategy" and "The single focus on Muslims in Prevent has been unhelpful" and "stigmatizing.").

16 *See Prevent Strategy* 2011, Home Office, http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/counter-terrorism/prevent/prevent-strategy/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2012); *Prevent* Strategy, *supra* note 5.

17 Empowering Local Partners SIP, *supra* note 1, at 6. *See also* New Amer. Found'n, Countering Domestic Radicalization Lessons for Intelligence Collection and Community Outreach 8 (2011), *available at* http://newamerica.net/publications/policy/countering_domestic_radicalization (noting that "The United States does not have a unified national counterterrorism plan on the same scale as the British CONTEST strategy, and it has never attempted to implement a coherent counter-radicalization program like Prevent" and providing an overview of the New York and Los Angeles Police Departments' activities in this area).

18 Empowering Local Partners SIP, *supra* note 1, at 2.

19 Empowering Local Partners, *supra* note 2, at 3 ("the Federal Government's most effective role in strengthening community partnerships and preventing violent extremism is as a facilitator, convener, and source of information"); Empowering Local Partners SIP, *supra* note 1, at 4 (referencing the role of agencies such as EDU and HHS). *See also* Josh Gerstein, *White House report: Locals key to anti-terror fight*, Politico, Aug. 3, 2011, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0811/60631.html ("'We're trying to shift the emphasis away from the traditional national security agencies' to agencies such as the Departments of Education and Health and Human Services, said Quintan Wiktorowicz, the White House's senior director for global engagement.").

20 Dina Temple-Raston, *White House Unveils Counter-Extremism Plan*, Nat'l Pub. Rad., Aug. 3, 2011, http://www.npr.org/2011/08/04/138955790/white-house-unveils-counter-extremism-plan.

21 Empowering Local Partners, *supra* note 2, at 3; Empowering Local Partners SIP, *supra* note 1, at 5 (discussing "leveraging existing public safety, violence prevention, and community resilience programming" as one of five cross-cutting elements of the new strategy).

22 Temple-Raston, *supra* note 20.

23 *See, e.g.*, Empowering Local Partners, *supra* note 2, at 2, 8.

24 *Prevent* Strategy, *supra* note 5, at 35.

25 Empowering Local Partners SIP, *supra* note 1, at 19.

26 Contest, *supra* note 9, at 60.

27 *See* Arun Kundnani, *Still spooked*, Institute of Race Relations, July 7, 2011, http://www.irr.org.uk/2011/july/bj000010.html ("The new strategy has also widened the definition of extremism from support for violence to any rejection of 'British values'; this is likely to mean a wider range of individuals are identified as potential radicals.").

28 Empowering Local Partners, *supra* note 2, at 6-7.

29 Kundnani, *supra* note 27 ("Moreover, with the new strategy's focus on universities, colleges and hospitals, a growing number of public service professionals will be drawn into the Channel identification process.").

30 Contest, *supra* note 9, at 60.

31 Interview with former *Prevent* Delivery Unit, Ass'n of Chief Police Officers, in London, U.K. (Feb. 2011).

32 Dep't for Communities and Local Gov't, Preventing Violent Extremism: Next Steps for Communities 30 (2008), *available at* http://www.communities.gov.uk/documents/communities/pdf/896799.pdf [hereinafter Preventing Violent Extremism: Next Steps for Communities].

33 Interview with former *Prevent* Delivery Unit, ACPO, *supra* note 31.

34 *Id. See further* ACPO *Prevent* Delivery Unit, *Prevent* Operation Nicole (2010), http://www.acpo.police.uk/documents/TAM/Op%20Nicole.pdf ("Operation Nicole is a table top exercise that has been developed by the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) *Prevent* Delivery Unit in conjunction with independent facilitators. It is predominantly aimed at Muslim communities and specifically designed to break down barriers between police and communities by promoting an understanding of how counter-terrorism operations work."); ACPO, *Prevent* ACT NOW for Schools 1 (2010), http://www.acpo.police.uk/documents/TAM/ACTNOW_ForSchoolsHEFE.pdf (ACT NOW is "an interactive counter terrorism exercise which provides communities with an insight into how police officers make decisions in the event of a terrorist incident.").

35 HM Gov., The Prevent Strategy: A Guide For Local Partners In England 17 (2008), *available at* https://www.education.gov.uk/publications/eOrderingDownload/Prevent_Strategy.pdf [hereinafter The Prevent Strategy: A Guide For Local Partners].

36 *Prevent* Strategy, *supra* note 5, at 47-54.

37 *Safeguarding Britain's National Security*, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/global-issues/counter-terrorism-policy/(as at June 7, 2011).

38 *Projecting British Muslims*, About, http://www.projectingbritishmuslims.co.uk/our_values.php (last visited Feb. 22, 2012). *See, e.g., British Muslims Visit Afghanistan*, Foreign & Commonwealth Office (Sep. 3, 2010), http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/news/latest-news/?view=News&id=22806656 (last visited Feb. 22, 2012).

39 *See, e.g., FCO Sends Its Diplomats Into UK Muslim Communities*, Engage (Sep. 24, 2009), http://www.iengage.org.uk/component/content/article/540-fco-sends-its-diplomats-into-uk-muslim-communities. *See also* Arun Kundnani, Institute of Race Relations, Spooked! How Not to Prevent Violent Extremism 12 (2009), *available at* http://www.irr.org.uk/pdf2/spooked.pdf.

40 *Projecting British Muslims*, Home, http://www.projectingbritishmuslims.co.uk (last visited Feb. 22, 2012).

41 According to CHRGJ's interview with the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications (CSCC), while current USG CVE communications efforts have focused on specific audiences, they have not at this time dealt specifically with women as a distinct audience, in terms of engaging specifically with Al-Qaeda ideological efforts to recruit women to perform acts of terrorism or raise their sons as terrorists: *see* A Decade Lost, *supra* note 7, at 107.

42 Interview with Muslim Contact Unit, Metropolitan Police, in London, U.K. (Feb. 2011).

43 Interview with *Prevent* and Research, Information and Communications Unit, Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism, Home Office, in London, U.K. (Feb. 2011).

44 Interview with former *Prevent* Delivery Unit, ACPO, *supra* note 31.

45 Preventing Violent Extremism: Next Steps for Communities, *supra* note 32, at 30; Interview with Metropolitan Police, in London, U.K. (Feb. 2011).

46 *See, e.g.*, Interview with Birmingham City Council, in Birmingham, U.K. (Feb. 2011); Interview with former *Prevent* Delivery Unit, ACPO, *supra* note 31; Interview with *Prevent* Delivery Unit, Ass'n of Chief Police Officers, in London, U.K. (Feb. 2011); Interview with Faith Matters, in London, U.K. (Feb. 2011).

47 *See, e.g.*, Interview with Birmingham City Council, *supra* note 46.

48 Dep't for Communities and Local Gov't, Empowering Muslim Women: Case Studies 2 (2008) [hereinafter Empowering Muslim Women], *available at* http://www.communities.gov.uk/documents/communities/pdf/669801.pdf.

49 Interview with *Prevent* Delivery Unit, ACPO, *supra* note 46.

50 Interview with Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism, Home Office, in London, U.K. (Feb. 2011).

51 Interview with Quilliam Foundation, in London, U.K. (Feb. 2011). *See also Quilliam Training and Consultancy*, http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/quilliam-outreach-and-training-unit.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2012) (listing Quilliam Foundation's trainings for USG entities, e.g., U.S. Department of Homeland Security).

52 Interview with Muslim Contact Unit, MET, *supra* note 42.

53 Interview with OSCT, Home Office, *supra* note 50.

54 *See, e.g.*, Interview with Families Against Stress and Trauma (FAST), in London, U.K. (Feb. 2011); Interview with former *Prevent* Delivery Unit, ACPO, *supra* note 31; Interview with MET, *supra* note 45; Interview with *Prevent* Delivery Unit, ACPO, *supra* note 46.

55 Interview with *Prevent* Delivery Unit, ACPO, *supra* note 46.

56 *See supra* note 34; ACPO, *Operation Hindsight* (2011), *available* at http://www.acpo.police.uk/documents/TAM/2011/20110412%20Prevent%20Hindsight%20Factsheet.pdf.

57 Interview with Birmingham City Council, *supra* note 46.

58 *See* Safer Birmingham Partnership, PVE Commissioned Services List v3 3 (2011), *available at* http://www.birmingham.gov.uk/cs/Satellite?c=BCC_Attachment_C&childpagename=Equalities%2FBCC_Attachment_C%2FFileAttachmentWithIconTemplate&cid=1223350579524&pagename=BCC%2FCommon%2FWrapper%2FInlineWrapper.

59 *See, e.g.*, The Prevent Strategy: A Guide For Local Partners, *supra* note 35, at 13-14.

60 Preventing Violent Extremism: Next Steps for Communities, *supra* note 32, at 30-32. *See, e.g.*, Interview with Department for Communities and Local Government, in London, U.K. (Feb. 2011) (noting that NMWAG's three main programs were: civic skills and participation; providing role models for non-traditional careers; and a theology working group).

61 Empowering Muslim Women, *supra* note 48, at 39-47.

62 710 Parl. Deb., H.L. (5th Ser.) (2009) WA44-53 (U.K.), *available at* http://services.parliament.uk/hansard/Lords/ByDate/20090430/writtenanswers/part009.html (cached version).

63 *Id.; see also* Faith Matters, Developing Diversity Directory (2009), *available at* http://faith-matters.org/images/stories/publications/Developing_Diversity.pdf

64 Interview with former *Prevent* Delivery Unit, ACPO, *supra* note 31.

65 *Prevent Women's Open Day*, ACPO *Prevent*, Feb. 2010, at 2, *available at* http://www.apa.police.uk/admin/uploads/attachment/docs/Members/Communications/APA_NEWS/183/ACPO_Prevent_Issue_7.pdf.

66 Interview with *Prevent* Delivery Unit, ACPO, *supra* note 46.

67 Taxpayer's Alliance, Research Note 75: Foreign Office Prevent Grants 6-9 (2010), *available at* http://www.taxpayersalliance.com/fcoprevent.pdf.

68 *Id.* at 7.

69 *Prevent* Strategy, *supra* note 5, at 44.

70 *Id.* at 68.

71 Interview with Lord Carlile of Berriew, QC, Indep. Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, in London, U.K. (Feb. 2011).

72 *Id.*

73 *Id.*

74 *Prevent* Strategy, *supra* note 5, at 37.

75 HM Gov., Prevent Strategy: Equality Impact Assessment, 2011 5 (U.K.), *available at* http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/counter-terrorism/prevent/prevent-strategy/prevent-review-eia?view=Binary [hereinafter Prevent: EIA]

76 *Id.* at 8-9.

77 *Id.* at 15.

78 *Id.* at 9.

79 *Id.* at 12.

80 *Id.*

81 *See Partnering with Communities to Prevent Violent Extremism in America*, *supra* note 3.

82 Interview with Cmty. Relations Unit, Office of Pub. Affairs, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, in Wash., D.C. (Apr. 2011). Note that as at April 2011, the FBI CRU stated that the FBI's community engagement does not have a nexus to countering violent extremism (in explicit contrast to, for example, the U.K.'s *Prevent* program until its recent revision); does not target the Muslim community, although relationships with some communities have "deepened" post-9/11 with closer attention to "where the threat emanates from"; does not differ from the FBI's long-term approach to community engagement; and is unaffected by FBI surveillance activity, given that it is the FBI's perception that the challenges in doing outreach to Muslim communities are no different from other communities. *See further* A Decade Lost, *supra* note 7, at 83-84.

83 NSS 2010, *supra* note 3, at 38. *See* A Decade Lost, *supra* note 7, at 18-29 (explaining the USG's approach to the relationship between women's rights and national security and exploring the consequences of this approach, including the instrumentalization of women's rights).

84 *See generally Prevent* Strategy, *supra* note 5; Preventing Violent Extremism, *supra* note 15; Kundnani, *supra* note 39.

85 *See, e.g.*, Institute of Race Relations, Young Muslim Voices Report 13-15 (2008-9), *available at* http://www.irr.

org.uk/pdf/YMV_report.pdf ("national research has shown that younger women are disproportionately affected by anti-Muslim racism. This is particularly true for girls and young women who are visibly Muslim." (at 14)).

86 *See, e.g.*, Sahar Aziz, *Time to Address Violence Against Muslim Women*, Huffington Post, Nov. 2, 2011 06:26 PM, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sahar-aziz/violence-again-muslim-women_b_1072529.html; Sahar Aziz, *From the Oppressed to the Terrorist: American Muslim Women Caught in the Crosshairs of Intersectionality*, Hastings Race & Poverty L. J., 8(1) (2012).

87 Aziz, *Time to Address Violence Against Muslim Women*, *supra* note 86.

88 Temple-Raston, *supra* note 20.

89 *See supra* note 21.

90 *See, e.g.*, Legal Momentum, The 287(g) Program: Harming Immigrant Women 1 (2010), *available at* http://www.legalmomentum.org/ourwork/gender-equity-and-gender-bias/reports-and-resources/the-287g-program-harming-immigrant-women.pdf. *See also* Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, *Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, transmitted by Note of the Secretary-General*, U.N. Doc. A/64/211 ¶ 49 (Aug. 3, 2009) [hereinafter *Rep. of the Special Rapporteur*].

91 Press Release, Am. Civil Liberties Union, ACLU of Florida Demands The Release Of Illegally Detained Woman In Lake County (Feb. 23, 2009), *available at* http://www.aclu.org/immigrants-rights/aclu-florida-demands-release-illegally-detained-woman-lake-county.

92 *Id.*

93 Empowering Local Partners SIP, *supra* note 1, at 2; Empowering Local Partners, *supra* note 2, at 8.

94 *Prevent Strategy 2011*, *supra* note 16.

95 *See supra* notes 85-92.

96 *See infra* note 136.

97 Empowering Local Partners SIP, *supra* note 1, at 4.

98 *See, e.g.*, Empowering Local Partners SIP, *supra* note 1, at fn. 2 (referencing the concept); *Prevent* Strategy, *supra* note 5, at 27 ("But the term resilience was never fully or comprehensively defined," such that, alongside the objective of addressing grievances, this "implicitly and sometimes explicitly encouraged the use of *Prevent* funding and *Prevent* delivery structures for a very wide range of projects, some of them more to do with cohesion than with counter-terrorism.").

99 *Prevent* Strategy, *supra* note 5, at 31 (these allegations include that "...projects received funding on the proviso that they collected information which was then passed to the police; statutory authorities were being encouraged to identify to the police...people who were being radicalised but who were holding views which were not illegal; the information the police were seeking was highly intrusive and included data on mental health, sexuality, and associates....)."

100 *Id. See also* Roots of Violent Radicalization, *supra* note 10, ¶ 80 (noting in respect of the new *Prevent* strategy, that "Despite the Government's efforts to remedy this perception, there is a lingering suspicion about the Prevent Strategy amongst Muslim communities, many of whom continue to believe that it is essentially a tool for intelligence-gathering or spying.").

101 Press Release, Am. Civil Liberties Union, FOIA Documents Show FBI Illegally Collecting Intelligence Under Guise of "Community Outreach" (Dec. 1, 2011), *available at* http://www.aclu.org/national-security/foia-documents-show-fbi-illegally-collecting-intelligence-under-guise-community.

102 Sahar Aziz, *The Contradictions of Obama's Outreach to American Muslims*, Huffington Post, Dec. 19, 2011 06:22 PM, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sahar-aziz/obama-american-muslim-outreach_b_1152359.html.

103 Email from Fahd Ahmed, Esq., Legal & Policy Dir., DRUM–Desis Rising Up & Moving (June 2011) (on file with author); *see also* A Decade Lost, *supra* note 7, at 85-86.

104 *See* A Decade Lost, *supra* note 7, at 82-83.

105 *Id.* at 85.

106 Temple-Raston, *supra* note 20.

107 Am. Civil Liberties Union, *supra* note 101.

108 *Id.*

109 Empowering Local Partners, *supra* note 2, at 5 (noting that one aim of community engagement is to "respond to community concerns about government policies and actions"); Empowering Local Partners SIP, *supra* note 1, at 7; Am. Civil Liberties Union, *ACLU Lens: Obama Plan to Fight Violent Extremism a Step in the Right Direction, But...* (Aug. 2, 2011, 5:48 PM), http://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security/aclu-lens-obama-plan-fight-violent-extremism-step-right-direction.

110 *See generally* A Decade Lost, *supra* note 7.

111 *See supra* notes 85-86; *see also* A Decade Lost, *supra* note 7, at 29, 95.

112 Interview with former *Prevent* Delivery Unit, ACPO, *supra* note 31.

113 Preventing Violent Extremism, *supra* note 15, at 22.

114 Interview with Muslim Contact Unit, MET, *supra* note 42.

115 *See generally*, Shiraz Maher & Martyn Frampton, Policy Exchange, Choosing Our Friends Wisely: Criteria for Engagement With Muslim Groups (2009), *available at* http://www.policyexchange.org.uk/images/publications/pdfs/Choosing_Our_Friends_Wisely.pdf.

116 *See Prevent* Strategy, *supra* note 5, at 39 ("Funding will not be provided to extremist organisations" and "It will not be part of this strategy to use extremists to deal with the risk from radicalisation."); Independent Oversight of Prevent Review and Strategy, *supra* note 14, at 5-7.

117 *See* Preventing Violent Extremism, *supra* note 15, app. Ev 105–07 (Memorandum from Oxfam (PVE 12)).

118 *Id.*

119 Empowering Local Partners SIP, *supra* note 1, at 19. *See also* Dina Temple-Raston, *New Terrorism Advisor Takes A 'Broad Tent' Approach*, Nat'l Pub. Radio, Jan. 24, 2011, http://www.npr.org/2011/01/24/133125267/new-terrorism-adviser-takes-a-broad-tent-approach (noting that Quintan Wiktorowicz—appointed to the National Security Council as Senior Director for Global Engagement after a period at the U.S. Embassy in the United Kingdom, where he examined the U.K.'s *Prevent* strategy—is a known proponent for a "broad-tent" approach that incorporates non-violent extremists into strategies that seek to counter violent extremism.).

120 A Decade Lost, *supra* note 7, at 108-10.

121 *Id.* at 110 ("The USG should vet all partners and messages in its strategic communication strategies to ensure that it does not sponsor messages or institutionalize power dynamics that exclude women and sexual minorities, undermine gender equality, or de-legitimize local advocacy efforts to use international human rights as a means to secure rights enjoyment.").

122 *Prevent Strategy 2011*, *supra* note 16.

123 A Decade Lost, *supra* note 7, at 23-26, 110. *See also* Roots of Violent Radicalization, *supra* note 10, ¶ 74 (noting in respect of the new *Prevent* strategy's non-funding of extremist organizations, that "the situation could arise whereby risk-averse public authorities discontinue funding for effective groups because of unfounded allegations of 'extremism'.")

124 *See, e.g.*, Interview with former *Prevent* Delivery Unit, ACPO, *supra* note 31.

125 Interview with Ulfah Arts, in Birmingham, U.K. (Feb. 2011); Interview with An-Nisa Society, in London, U.K. (Feb. 2011).

126 Shaista Gohir, Muslim Women's Network UK, Submission from the Muslim Women's Network UK for the Inquiry into the Preventing Violent Extremism Program 6 (2009), *available at* http://www.mwnuk.co.uk/go_files/downloads/828909-MWNUK%20submission%20for%20PVE%20Inquiry.pdf.

127 *See, e.g.*, Interview with An-Nisa Society, *supra* note 125.

128 Interview with former *Prevent* Delivery Unit, ACPO, *supra* note 31.

129 Interview with MET, *supra* note 45.

130 *Id.*

131 *See* An-Nisa Society, Home, http://www.an-nisa.org/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2012); Khalida Khan, An-Nisa Society, Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) and Prevent: A Response From The Muslim Community 4 (2009), *available at* http://www.an-nisa.org/downloads/PVE_and_Prevent_-__A_Muslim_response.pdf (noting that this approach is also inimical to goals to prevent violent extremism, as "Funding grassroots Muslim groups to deliver Prevent is unhelpful as it causes them to lose credibility and trust with the very groups the government wants them to engage."); Interview with City Circle, in London, U.K. (Feb. 2011) (noting that City Circle declined *Prevent* funds because of its concern it would tar its relationship with the community).

132 Empowering Local Partners SIP, *supra* note 1, at 18.

133 *See generally* Faiza Patel, Brennan Center for Justice, Rethinking Radicalization (2011), *available at* http://brennan.3cdn.net/f737600b433d98d25e_6pm6beukt.pdf (exploring the adverse legal and policy implications of a "thinly-sourced, reductionist" and "Religious Conveyor Belt" theory of radicalization in the United States).

134 Am. Civil Liberties Union, *supra* note 109 (citing Hina Shamsi, Director of the ACLU National Security Project).

135 710 Parl. Deb., H.L. (5th Ser.), *supra* note 62, at 45.

136 Interview with Ulfah Arts, *supra* note 125 (noting that making Muslim women visible was "the only benefit of it [*Prevent*]"); Interview with former *Prevent* Delivery Unit, ACPO, *supra* note 31 ("*Prevent* money gave voice to the silences."). *See also* Preventing Violent Extremism, *supra* note 15, at Ev. 15 (Evidence of Naz Koser, Ulfah Arts, noting that: "What *Prevent* has done is make Muslim women very visible, so now if I want to do a tour up north I know a number of Muslim women's organisations and for me as an organisation in that sense it has been quite productive, but in relation to what the Government's aims are and what they are trying to achieve, that is something I cannot answer, I am afraid.").

137 Interview with *Prevent* Delivery Unit, ACPO, *supra* note 46.

138 Interview with former *Prevent* Delivery Unit, ACPO, *supra* note 31.

139 *Id.*

140 *See* Katherine Brown, *Gender and Counter-Terrorism: UK Prevent and De-Radicalisation Strategies* 11 (Aug. 31 2010) (unpublished manuscript), *available at* http://www.britishpoliticsgroup.org/BPG%202010-Brown.pdf.

141 Gohir, *supra* note 126, at 6.

142 Interview with *Prevent* Delivery Unit, ACPO, *supra* note 46.

143 *See, e.g., Rep. of the Special Rapporteur*, *supra* note 90, ¶ 31 (discussing the impermissibility of collective punitive sanctions) and ¶¶ 40-41 (discussing the impacts of targeted sanctions and control orders on family members).

144 *See, e.g., id.* ¶ 31 (noting the need to reject "stereotypical gender norms about roles of women within the family" in counter-terrorism efforts).

145 *See generally* Brown, *supra* note 140, at 3-12.

146 *See, e.g.*, Haroon Siddique, *Muslim Women: Beyond the Stereotype*, Guardian (London), Apr. 29, 2011, *available at* http://www.guardian.co.uk/lifeandstyle/2011/apr/29/muslim-women-fighting-islamic-extremism/.

147 *Rep. of the Special Rapporteur*, *supra* note 90, ¶ 34. *See further* A Decade Lost, *supra* note 7, at 29 (discussing additional effects of such harmful stereotypes).

148 A Decade Lost, *supra* note 7, at 20-21.

149 *Id.*

150 *Rep. of the Special Rapporteur*, *supra* note 90, ¶¶ 46-47.

151 *Prevent* Strategy, *supra* note 5, at 36.

152 A Decade Lost, *supra* note 7, at 28.

153 Prevent: EIA, *supra* note 75, at 12

154 *See further* A Decade Lost, *supra* note 7, at 111-14.